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[The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) constitutes a] radical 
departure . . . from common law regarding the traditional asset 
protection afforded by discretionary dynasty trusts as well as 
spendthrift trusts in general.1 
Mr. Merric’s article contains numerous unsupported statements, 
mischaracterizations and misinformation about the UTC and about 
American trust law in general.  Even worse, using scare tactics that 
take advantage of the fact that most state legislators’ constituents 
lack trust law expertise, its clear intention is to undermine legislative 
support for the UTC.2 
The Uniform Trust Code3 is the first comprehensive codification of 
the law of trusts.  Approved in 2000 by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the UTC has since 
been enacted (sometimes in modified form) in at least a dozen 
jurisdictions.  The UTC has not been without controversy.  As 
evidenced by the epigraphs above, Article Five of the UTC—
concerning creditors’ rights—has generated a veritable war of words, 
with opponents claiming that enactment of the UTC will result in dire 
consequences to the traditional creditor-protection benefits associated 
with spendthrift and discretionary trusts.  The purpose of this Article is 
to examine Article Five and the controversy it has engendered. 
 
 1 Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be 
Affected by the UTC?, 31 EST. PLAN. 478, 478 (2004). 
 2 Letter from David M. English et al., U.S. Trust Law Experts Respond to Attack on the 
Uniform Trust Code (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/UTCResponse_Feb04.pdf 
(referencing Mark Merric et al., The Uniform Trust Code, Is Arizona’s Nightmare About to 
Become Yours? (on file with Cardozo Law Review, previously available at 
http://www.internationalcounselor.com), [hereinafter Arizona’s Nightmare]). 
 3 Except as otherwise indicated, citations to the UTC and its comments reflect amendments 
through 2005. 
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Part I of the Article offers some background about the UTC and its 
development.  Part I also describes, in summary fashion, some of the 
controversies that have surrounded the UTC—including the controversy 
over Article Five—and explains how these controversies have, in some 
cases, inhibited adoption of the UTC by the states. 
Part II examines the operative rules of Article Five; the purpose of 
Part II is to set up the discussions in Parts III and IV.  Part III of the 
article examines and responds to the critics’ principal assertions about 
Article Five.  Finally, Part IV offers a normative analysis of particular 
elements of Article Five and makes some modest suggestions for 
reform. 
 
I.     BACKGROUND 
A.     Development of the UTC and Its Adoption by the States4 
 
The UTC is the product of over a decade of study and drafting by 
NCCUSL.  The process began in 1993 with the appointment of a study 
committee chaired by Maurice Hartnett, a Delaware Supreme Court 
justice and former justice of the Delaware Chancery Court, with 
substantial experience in trust cases.5  The function of the study 
committee was to decide whether the Uniform Law Commissioners 
should undertake the drafting of a comprehensive uniform law on trusts.  
The study committee recommended the formation of a drafting 
committee, which was appointed in 1994, with Judge Hartnett serving 
as its chair.6  David M. English, now the Fratcher Professor of Law at 
the University of Missouri-Columbia, served as Reporter for the 
drafting committee.7  The drafting committee was served by numerous 
advisors, which included representatives from the American Bar 
Association Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, the 
American Bankers Association, and the American College of Trust and 
Estate Counsel.8  In drafting the UTC, the committee considered the 
comprehensive trust statutes that already existed in some states—most 
notably California, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas9—and used the 1986 
 
 4 This section of the Article borrows liberally from John E. Donaldson & Robert T. 
Danforth, The Virginia Uniform Trust Code, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 325, 327-33 (2005). 
 5 See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy 
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 145 (2002). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 David M. English, Representing Estate and Trust Beneficiaries and Fiduciaries (ALI-ABA 
Course of Study, Feb. 10-11, 2005), WL SK089 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 191, 193 (2005). 
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California statute as its initial drafting model.  The drafters also drew 
heavily upon the common law as expressed in the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts, the emerging 
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts, and the Restatement (Second) 
of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers).10 
After approximately seven years of work in preparing the draft, the 
Uniform Law Commissioners approved the UTC on August 3, 2000.11  
Following a review of the NCCUSL Style Committee, the final text of 
the UTC was completed on October 9, 2000.12  The official comments 
were completed on April 25, 2001.13  The UTC was approved by the 
American Bar Association House of Delegates at its mid-year meeting 
in February 2001.14  Technical amendments to the UTC were approved 
by NCCUSL in 2001, 2003, and 2004.15  NCCUSL approved further 
amendments to the UTC in 2005, several of which concern Article Five. 
As of the fall of 2005, the UTC, with some state-to-state variations, 
has been adopted in Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Maine, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.  
Studies of the UTC undertaken by bar associations and special 
commissions are complete or nearing completion in a number of 
additional states.  Legislative consideration of state versions of the UTC 
in late 2005 or early 2006 is expected in Alabama, Massachusetts, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania.  Bar association studies are underway in Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, and 
Washington. 
The UTC was also initially adopted in Arizona in 2003, but  almost 
immediately following enactment, a small group of lawyers began a 
public campaign to have the UTC repealed.  In December 2003, the 
Arizona legislature voted to delay the effective date of the UTC for two 
years, and the statute was eventually repealed in 2004.  In Arizona, at 
the heart of the controversy were the claims of a small but vocal group 





 10 See English, supra note 5, at 147-48. 
 11 See English, supra note 9, at 193. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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B.     Criticisms of the UTC 
 
The UTC has been the subject of pointed criticism from a small 
segment of the estate planning bar, most of whom apparently focus their 
practices on so-called asset protection planning—that is, the structuring 
of clients’ affairs to shelter assets from the claims of creditors.  These 
lawyers have voiced their criticisms through numerous articles in 
professional journals,16 through e-mail listserves,17 on web sites devoted 
to the topic,18 and through interviews with newspapers and magazines.19  
The most vocal of these critics has been Mark Merric, a Colorado 
lawyer specializing in asset protection planning, who has devoted the 
better part of the last several years in a campaign to prevent state 
legislatures from adopting the UTC.  Mr. Merric has spoken and written 
prolifically about the UTC,20 arguing in numerous ways that the UTC 
significantly erodes the creditor-protection attributes of trusts enjoyed 
under the common law.  Most of Mr. Merric’s criticism has focused on 
creditors’ rights issues, and it is with this topic that this Article is 
principally concerned.  Another frequent topic of criticism is the UTC 
provisions requiring trustees to furnish certain information to 
beneficiaries. 
The latter topic of criticism led to an unusual sequence of events in 
Arizona.  In 2003, a bill enacting the UTC was passed unanimously by 
the Arizona House and Senate and was signed into law by the Governor.  
 
 16 See generally Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on the Asset Protection 
of Spendthrift Trusts, 31 EST. PLAN. 375 (2004) [hereinafter Effect of the UTC]; Mark Merric & 
Steven J. Oshins, UTC May Reduce the Asset Protection of Non-Self-Settled Trusts, 31 EST. 
PLAN. 411 (2004) [hereinafter Non-Self-Settled Trusts]; Merric & Oshins, supra note 1; Mark 
Merric et al., Malpractice Issues and the Uniform Trust Code, 31 EST. PLAN. 586 (2004) 
[hereinafter Malpractice Issues]; Mark Merric & Douglas W. Stein, A Threat to All SNTs, 143 TR. 
& EST. 38 (2004); Mark Merric et al., The Uniform Trust Code: A Divorce Attorney’s Dream, J. 
PRAC. EST. PLAN., Oct.-Nov. 2004, at 41 [hereinafter A Divorce Attorney’s Dream]. 
 17 The principal vehicle for public criticism of the UTC has been the listserve sponsored by 
WealthCounsel, LLC, as described at http://wealthcounsel.com/listservs.aspx. 
 18 See, for example, the web site for Merric Law Firm, LLC, at 
http://www.internationalcounselor.com, which includes numerous posting about the UTC. 
 19 See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, The Great Trust Rebellion, FORBES, Aug. 16, 2004, at 122; 
Rachel Emma Silverman, Trust Laws Get a Makeover, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2004, at D1. 
 20 For a number of reasons—as will be more apparent from the discussion in Part III—Mr. 
Merric’s criticisms of the UTC have been a source of considerable frustration for those who try to 
refute them.  First, his explanations are often murky, making it a challenge to formulate a 
response.  Second, his writings are hyperbolic—in his view, the effects of the UTC are not just 
undesirable, they are disastrous; those who read his articles uncritically approach the UTC with 
exaggerated concerns about its effects.  Finally, an essential premise for his position—the status 
of creditors under the common law—is, in my view, incorrectly understood or, at least, 
incorrectly described.  Thus, he views the UTC as shifting the law away from a position that 
arguably it never held.  Assuaging the concerns of those about “changes” in the law is made more 
difficult by this faulty premise. 
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The bill had an effective date of January 1, 2004.21  During the months 
following its enactment, the UTC became the subject of much 
controversy.  Opponents of the UTC objected most vociferously to the 
provisions in the statute requiring a trustee to furnish information to 
beneficiaries.22  According to the opponents, these provisions 
dramatically changed the common law rules governing information that 
must be provided to beneficiaries and seriously undermined the ability 
of settlors to keep information about their trusts private.23  Opponents 
also objected on procedural grounds, claiming that the legislation had 
been enacted without adequate opportunity for public input.24  The topic 
was the subject of substantial debate in the news media,25 as well as on 
talk radio.26  In December 2003, the legislature, in a special session, 
 
 21 See Gordon Waterfall, The Uniform Trust Code is Arizona-Bound, 40 ARIZ. ATT’Y. 18 
(2003). 
 22 The significant reporting and disclosure duties imposed on trustees under the UTC are set 
forth in section 813 and may be summarized as follows.  First, a trustee must keep “qualified 
beneficiaries” reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and material facts 
necessary to the protection of their interests; moreover, unless unreasonable under the 
circumstances, a trustee must respond promptly to requests from beneficiaries for information 
regarding administration matters.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a) (2005); see also id. § 103(13) 
(defining “qualified beneficiary” to exclude those with remote, contingent interests).  Second, 
upon request of a beneficiary (not limited to qualified beneficiaries) the trustee must promptly 
furnish a copy of the trust instrument.  Id. § 813 (b)(1).  Third, a trustee must notify qualified 
beneficiaries of any change in the method or rate of the trustee’s compensation.  Id. § 813(b)(4).  
Fourth, a trustee must, within 60 days of accepting a trusteeship, give notice to qualified 
beneficiaries of its acceptance and certain contact information.  Id. § 813(b)(2).  Fifth, within 60 
days of learning that an irrevocable trust has been created or that a formally revocable trust  has 
become irrevocable, the trustee must notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trust’s existence, the 
identity of the settlor, the right to request a copy of the trust instrument, and (as discussed below) 
the right to receive annual reports.  Id. § 813(b)(3).  Finally, and most importantly, a trustee  must 
furnish, at least annually, to distributees and permissible distributees (and to other qualified or 
non-qualified beneficiaries requesting the same) reports of receipts and disbursements, assets and 
liabilities, the amount of the trustee’s compensation, and, if feasible, statements of the market 
value of assets on hand.  Id. § 813(c). 
  Partly in response to the controversy in Arizona, the notice rules of section 813 were 
designated as “optional” in amendments adopted by NCCUSL in 2004.  See id. § 105 cmt. 
(discussing 2004 amendments). 
 23 See generally Mike Fimea, Privacy Issues at Center of Revision Quest, ARIZ. BUS. 
GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 2004, at 1. 
 24 Paul Davenport, Law Wasn’t Controversial When Passed, AP ALERT, Dec. 26, 2003. 
 25 See generally Russ Wiles, Veil of Privacy Will Be Removed Jan. 1, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 
23, 2003, at 1; Russ Wiles, Law Raises Questions for Creators of Trusts and for Beneficiaries, 
ARIZZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 23, 2003, at 4; Russ Wiles, New Trust Law Rattles Estate Planners, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 7, 2003, at 4; Russ Wiles, Trust Law Put on Hold Until 2006: State Bar 
Wants Time to Examine Impacts, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Trust Law Put 
on Hold]. 
 26 See Davenport, supra note 24 (discussing the talk-radio program hosted by lawyer Keith 
DeGreen). 
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voted to delay the UTC’s effective date,27 and in April 2004 the Arizona 
UTC was repealed altogether.28 
In their efforts to prevent the enactment of the UTC in other 
jurisdictions, Mark Merric and other opponents of the UTC have 
frequently cited the Arizona experience, claiming essentially that 
Arizona legislators successfully enacted the statute only because they 
were unaware of the UTC’s serious deficiencies.29  According to Mr. 
Merric and others, a significant reason that the statute was repealed in 
Arizona is that the Arizona legislature, upon further study, recognized 
the UTC as a “radical departure” from the common law concerning 
creditors’ rights in trusts.  As more fully discussed in Part III, in my 
view this is not a fair or reasonable characterization of the statute. 
 
II.     OPERATIVE RULES OF ARTICLE FIVE 
 
This Part of the Article describes the principal operative rules of 
Article Five.  Sections 501 through 504 and section 506 of the UTC 
govern the rights of creditors of beneficiaries who are not the settlor of a 
trust; it is these provisions with which this Article is principally 
concerned.  Section 505 governs the rights of creditors of the settlor; 
although this Article is not primarily concerned with the rights of 
creditors of the settlor, it nevertheless discusses section 505, because the 
section is relevant to the rights of creditors of non-settlor beneficiaries 
holding withdrawal powers, who are treated as settlors to a limited 
extent.  Moreover, as later discussed, unstated dissatisfaction with 
section 505 may underlie the critics’ more overt complaints about other 
aspects of Article Five.30 
 
A.     Rights of Creditors of Non-settlor Beneficiaries 
1.     Section 501 
 
Section 501 of the UTC, which applies in the rare case31 in which a 
trust does not contain a spendthrift provision,32 provides that “the court 
 
 27 See Trust Law Put on Hold, supra note 25. 
 28 Napolitano Signs Repeal of Estate Planning Rules, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 2004, at D3. 
 29 See, e.g., Arizona’s Nightmare, supra note 2. 
 30 See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the critics’ complaint that the 
UTC is “regressive”). 
 31 Section 501 also applies in the even rarer case in which a spendthrift provision does not 
apply to the interest of a particular beneficiary or to a particular interest (such as the income 
interest) of a beneficiary.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 cmt. (2005) (first paragraph). 
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may authorize a creditor . . . of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s 
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the 
benefit of the beneficiary or other means.”33  As the official comment 
makes clear, section 501 “does not necessarily mean that the creditor 
can collect all distributions made to the beneficiary”;34 for example, 
“[t]he interest may be too indefinite or contingent for the creditor to 
reach.”35  Moreover, the statute also provides that “[t]he court may limit 
the award to such relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.”36  
The comment explains the purpose of this language as follows: 
Because proceedings to satisfy a claim are equitable in nature, the 
second sentence of this section ratifies the court’s discretion to limit 
the award as appropriate under the circumstances.  In exercising its 
discretion to limit relief, the court may appropriately consider the 
circumstances of a beneficiary and the beneficiary’s family.37 
 
 32 Section 501, as amended in 2005, provides: 
To the extent a beneficiary’s interest is not subject to a spendthrift provision, the court 
may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s 
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary or other means.  The court may limit the award to such relief as is 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2005).  Before the 2005 amendment, the statute provided: 
To the extent a beneficiary’s interest is not protected by a spendthrift provision, the 
court may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s 
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary or other means.  The court may limit the award to such relief as is 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2003) (amended 2005) (emphasis added).  The 2005 amendment 
changed the italicized phrase from “is not protected by” to “is not subject to”; the comment 
accompanying the amendment explains the change as follows: 
A 2005 amendment changes “protected by” to “subject to” in the first sentence of the 
section.  No substantive change is intended.  The amendment was made to negate an 
implication that this section allowed an exception creditor to reach a beneficiary’s 
interest even though the trust contained a spendthrift provision.  The list of exception 
creditors and their remedies are contained in Section 503.  Clarifying changes are also 
made in the comments and unnecessary language on creditor remedies omitted. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 cmt. (2005) (discussing 2005 amendments).  The comment to section 
501, as amended in 2005, further states that “[t]his section applies only if the trust does not 
contain a spendthrift provision or the spendthrift provision does not apply to a particular 
beneficiary’s interest.”  Id. Thus, section 501 is properly interpreted as applying only to such 
trusts and not to claims by exception creditors against trusts that include spendthrift provisions; 
the remedies available to an exception creditor are described in section 503.  The purpose of the 
2005 amendment to section 501 was to resolve ambiguity in the statute concerning this issue. 
 33 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501. 
 34 Id. § 501 cmt. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. § 501. 
 37 Id. § 501 cmt. 
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Thus, for example, the statute apparently would permit a court to 
deny distributions to a creditor if the support needs of the beneficiary or 
the beneficiary’s dependents could not otherwise be met.38 
2.     Section 502 
 
Section 50239 establishes several fundamental rules.  First, a 
spendthrift provision in a trust is valid only if it restrains both voluntary 
and involuntary transfers of a beneficiary’s interest.40  Thus, consistent 
with traditional doctrine, a provision that purports to restrict either 
voluntary or involuntary transfers alone will succeed in restricting 
neither type of transfer.  Second, a settlor can establish spendthrift 
protection for a trust simply by stating that “the interest of a beneficiary 
is held subject to a ‘spendthrift trust,’ or words of similar import.”41  
Finally, and most importantly, if an interest in trust is subject to a valid 
spendthrift provision, “[a] beneficiary may not transfer [the] interest” 
and “a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest 
or a distribution by the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary.”42  
The statute also provides that the general rule may be subject to 
exceptions established elsewhere in the statute;43 this presumably 
constitutes a reference to section 503, which governs the rights of so-
called exception creditors—those given access to trust interests 
 
 38 This statutory concept is based in large part on language from a comment to section 56 of 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts: 
[T]he court will give creditors relief that is fair and reasonable under the 
circumstances.  If the beneficiary has only a right to the trust income or a right 
periodically to receive ascertainable or discretionary (but see § 60) payments, the court 
will normally direct the trustee to make the payments to the creditor until the claim, 
with interest, is satisfied.  The court, however, may order less than all of the payments 
to be made to the creditor, leaving some distributions for the actual needs of the 
beneficiary and his or her family. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. e (2003). 
 39 Section 502 provides: 
(a)  A spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary 
transfer of a beneficiary’s interest. 
(b)  A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held subject to a 
“spendthrift trust,” or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary 
and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest. 
(c)  A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of a valid 
spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided in this [article], a creditor or 
assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution by the trustee 
before its receipt by the beneficiary. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2005). 
 40 Id. § 502(a). 
 41 Id. § 502(b). 
 42 Id. § 502(c). 
 43 See id. (indicating that the general rule limiting creditor and assignee access to spendthrift 
trust interests applies “except as otherwise provided in this [article]”). 
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notwithstanding spendthrift protection.  The comment to section 502 
limits the application of the general rule by stating that “[a] spendthrift 
provision is ineffective against a beneficial interest retained by the 







3.     Section 503 
 
Section 503 creates several categories of exception creditors and 
establishes the remedies available to them. 
The three categories of exception creditors are set forth in 
subsection (b) of section 503 as follows: 
A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against: 
(1) a beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse who has a 
judgment or court order against the beneficiary for support or 
maintenance; 
(2) a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection 
of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust; and 
(3) a claim of this State or the United States to the extent a statute of 
this State or federal law so provides.45 
The first and third categories of exception creditors are consistent 
with traditional doctrine, although several enacting jurisdictions have 
opted to delineate these categories more narrowly.46  The second 
category, although not entirely consistent with the common law,47 is 
based on section 59(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and is also 
consistent with the prior two Restatements.  As explained in the 
comment to section 503, its purpose is to “allow[] a beneficiary of 
modest means to overcome an obstacle preventing the beneficiary’s 
obtaining services essential to the protection or enforcement of the 
beneficiary’s rights under the trust.”48  Thus, for example, the 
beneficiary’s lawyer in trust litigation would be entitled to recover from 
the trust if the lawyer obtains a judgment against the beneficiary for the 
 
 44 Id. § 502 cmt. 
 45 Id. § 503(b). 
 46 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.03.B. (2005) (omitting spouses and former spouses 
from the list). 
 47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 reporter’s notes to cmts. c & d (2003). 
 48 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2005). 
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lawyer’s fee.  Note that, unlike the Restatements,49 the statute does not 
create an exception for suppliers of necessaries, or for tort victims.50 
Notably, section 503 is of limited effect—under subsection (c), it 
permits an exception creditor to “obtain from a court an order attaching 
present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”51  
As explained in the comment, “[d]istributions subject to attachment 
[under this provision] include distributions required by the express 
terms of the trust, such as mandatory payments of income, and 
distributions the trustee has otherwise decided to make, such as through 
the exercise of discretion.”52  The comment emphasizes this point by 
further explaining that section 503 “does not authorize [an exception 
creditor] to compel a distribution from the trust.”53  In other words, 
section 503 simply makes a spendthrift provision ineffective as to 
certain categories of claims and claimants; the claimant must still 
overcome other obstacles to recovering from the trust, such as language 
in the trust granting the trustee discretion in making distributions.  
Moreover, even if a claimant succeeds in attaching a beneficiary’s 
interest, section 503 provides, as in section 501, that “[t]he court may 
limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.”  
Essentially, in formulating an award for a particular claim, the court is 
expressly permitted to consider the support needs and other financial 
circumstances of the beneficiary and the beneficiary’s family.54 
 
 49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b) (providing that, notwithstanding a 
spendthrift provision, a beneficiary’s interest can be reached in satisfaction of a claim for 
“services or supplies provided for necessities”). 
 50 The official comment to section 503 explains these omissions as follows: 
Unlike Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 
1999), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 157(b) (1959), this Code does not 
create an exception to the spendthrift restriction for creditors who have furnished 
necessary services or supplies to the beneficiary. Most of these cases involve claims by 
governmental entities, which the drafters concluded are better handled by the 
enactment of special legislation as authorized by subsection (b)(3). The drafters also 
declined to create an exception for tort claimants. For a discussion of the exception for 
tort claims, which has not generally been recognized, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
Section 59 Reporter’s Notes to cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt.  
 51 Note that this remedy is more limited than that available under section 501, which also 
permits a creditor to reach the beneficiary’s interest by “other means,” language intended to 
authorize a court to order the sale of a beneficiary’s interest.  See infra notes 219-221 and 
accompanying text. 
 52 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. 
 53 Id. (emphasis added). 
 54 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing the identical language contained 
in section 501). 
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4.     Section 504 
 
Section 504, the portion of the statute that has generated the most 
controversy, contains rules determining creditors’ rights with respect to 
distributions subject to a trustee’s discretion.  The general rule, stated in 
subsection (b), provides that, 
whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor of a 
beneficiary may not compel a distribution that is subject to the 
trustee’s discretion, even if: 
(1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of 
distribution; or 
(2) the trustee has abused the discretion. 
Section 504(b) deliberately eliminates the distinction between 
discretionary trusts and so-called support trusts—the latter being trusts 
in which distributions are subject to a standard, such as one pertaining 
to the beneficiary’s support, health, or education.55  The comment to 
section 504 makes clear that, “[b]y eliminating this distinction, the 
rights of a creditor are the same whether the distribution standard is 
discretionary, subject to a standard, or both.”56  Both the statute and the 
comment also make clear that eliminating the distinction affects only 
the rights of creditors—it does not affect the right of a beneficiary to 
compel a distribution, which, under section 504(d), a beneficiary has the 
right to do if the trustee has abused its discretion or failed to comply 
 
 55 Most trusts that establish standards for making distributions (as opposed to wholly 
discretionary interests) also grant the trustee some discretion in executing the standard.  A typical 
provision might state that the trustee “may pay to or for the benefit of X such amounts of income 
and principal as shall be necessary for X’s support, health, or education” or “shall pay to or for 
the benefit of X such amounts of income and principal as the trustee deems necessary for X’s 
support, health, or education.”  Note that, regardless of whether the dispositive language is 
phrased as mandatory (“shall pay”) or discretionary (“may pay”), in both cases the trustee must 
make discretionary determinations—in the second example, although the dispositive provision is 
phrased as mandatory, the trustee must exercise its discretion in determining what is “necessary.”  
Only rarely will a dispositive provision subject to a standard fail to include language granting the 
trustee discretion—for example, the trustee “shall pay to or for the benefit of X such amounts of 
income and principal as shall be necessary for X’s support, health, or education.”  Whether this 
language grants the trustee discretion, and thus would be subject to section 504(b), is an open 
question.  In my view, the proper answer is “yes,” because the trust implicitly contemplates that 
the trustee will exercise its discretion in determining the timing and amount of distributions 
“necessary” under the circumstances.  A support provision granting the trustee no discretion 
whatsoever would presumably be treated as purely mandatory, in which case it would be subject 
to the rules of section 506, as discussed in Part II.A.5.  See also infra note 114 (discussing a 2005 
amendment clarifying that support standards will be interpreted as granting the trustee discretion). 
 56 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. 
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with a standard for distribution.57  Section 504(d) is discussed further 
below. 
The general rule of section 504(b) is subject to an important 
exception.  Under section 504(c), 
[t]o the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of 
distribution or has abused a discretion: 
(1)  a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judgment 
or court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance of 
the beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse; and 
(2)  the court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or 
former spouse such amount as is equitable under the circumstances 
but not more than the amount the trustee would have been required 
to distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary had the trustee 
complied with the standard or not abused the discretion. 
Note that the exception applies only to claims of children, spouses, 
and former spouses;58 other categories of creditors are not afforded the 
benefits of this provision.  Note also that the exception applies only to 
claims for support; thus, it presumably would not apply to a claim in 
connection with an equitable distribution order, nor would it apply to 
other types of claims of a child, spouse, or former spouse (such as a 
claim for money damages or restitution).  Finally, note carefully two 
limitations on the amounts that may be paid in satisfaction of any claim.  
First, the amount paid cannot exceed the amount that the trustee would 
have been required to distribute, assuming that the trustee complied 
with the applicable standard and did not abuse his or her discretion.  In 
other words, the claimant’s access to the trust assets cannot exceed that 
of the beneficiary.  Moreover, the claimant can reach only amounts that 
the trustee would have been required to distribute, not amounts that the 
trustee would have been permitted to distribute.  Second, the amount 
paid must be “equitable under the circumstances”; thus, a successful 
 
 57 Section 504(d) provides that “[t]his section does not limit the right of a beneficiary to 
maintain a judicial proceeding against a trustee for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply 
with a standard for distribution.”  Id. § 504(d).  The comment states that 
[e]liminating this distinction [between discretionary and support trusts] affects only the 
rights of creditors.  The affect [sic] of this change is limited to the rights of creditors.  It 
does not affect the rights of a beneficiary to compel a distribution.  Whether the trustee 
has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on factors such as the 
breadth of the discretion granted and whether the terms of the trust include a support or 
other standard.  See Section 814 comment. 
Id. § 504 cmt.  The comment further states that, “[u]nder subsection (d), the power to force a 
distribution due to an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard belongs solely to 
the beneficiary.”  Id. 
 58 A number of adopting jurisdictions have modified section 503(b) to allow claims by 
children only.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.03.B (2005). 
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claimant is not automatically entitled to the maximum amount that 
would have been distributed to the beneficiary.59 
Section 504(d) makes clear that section 504 “does not limit the 
right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial proceeding against a trustee 
for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard for 
distribution.”60  Thus, the rights of beneficiaries with respect to 
discretionary distributions exceeds the rights of creditors, except for the 
categories of creditors and claims described in subsection (c).  As 
discussed in Part III.D, section 504(b) has generated some concern 
among the UTC critics, in particularly that section 504(d), in 
combination with section 814(a)—the latter of which requires a trustee 
to exercise discretionary powers “in good faith and in accordance with 
the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the 
beneficiaries”61—expands the powers of beneficiaries to compel 
distributions beyond the powers held at common law.  As later 
discussed in Part III.D, in my view this concern is misplaced. 
Section 504(e)62 was added to the UTC in 2004 to limit the 
circumstances in which the assets of a trust can be reached by the 
creditors of a beneficiary by virtue of the beneficiary’s status as trustee.  
Under this provision, as long as a trustee’s power to make distributions 
for his or her own benefit is limited to an “ascertainable standard,” “a 
creditor may not reach or compel distribution of the beneficial interest 
except to the extent the interest would be subject to the creditor’s claim 
were the beneficiary not acting as trustee or cotrustee.”63  The 2004 
amendment also added section 103(2), which assigns the same meaning 
to “ascertainable standard” as in the Internal Revenue Code.64  As 
 
 59 But see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (noting that, in fixing the amount that would be 
equitable under the circumstances, “the court having jurisdiction over the trust should consider 
that in setting the respective support award, the family court has already considered the respective 
needs and assets of the family”). 
 60 Id. § 504(d). 
 61 The full text of section 814(a) is as follows: 
Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the terms of the trust, 
including the use of such terms as “absolute”, “sole”, or “uncontrolled”, the trustee 
shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and 
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. 
Id. § 814(a).  “Interests of the beneficiaries” is a defined term: under section 103(8), it means “the 
beneficial interests provided in the terms of the trust.”  Id. § 103(8). 
 62 Section 504(e) provides: 
If the trustee’s or cotrustee’s discretion to make distributions for the trustee’s or 
cotrustee’s own benefit is limited by an ascertainable standard, a creditor may not 
reach or compel distribution of the beneficial interest except to the extent the interest 
would be subject to the creditor’s claim were the beneficiary not acting as trustee or 
cotrustee. 
Id. § 504(e). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Section 103(2) provides: 
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explained in the official comment, section 504(e) was added because 
beneficiaries routinely serve as trustees, and a rule allowing creditors to 
reach trust assets under those circumstances would “unduly disrupt 
standard estate planning.”65 
5.     Section 506 
 
Section 506 provides that, “[w]hether or not a trust contains a 
spendthrift provision, a creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may reach a 
mandatory distribution of income or principal . . . if the trustee has not 
made the distribution . . . within a reasonable time after the designated 
distribution date.”66  As explained in the comment, the principle 
underlying this rule is that, upon the expiration of a reasonable period 
after the designated distribution date, “payments mandated by the 
express terms of the trust are in effect being held by the trustee as agent 
for the beneficiary and should be treated as part of the beneficiary’s 
personal assets.”67  A significant 2005 amendment added a new 
subsection (a), which furnishes a helpful definition: 
 
“Ascertainable standard” means a standard relating to an individual’s health, education, 
support, or maintenance within the meaning of Section 2041(b)(1)(A) or 2514(c)(1) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on [the effective date of this [Code] 
[amendment] [, or as later amended]. 
Id. § 103(2) (alterations in original).  Sections 2041(b)(1)(A) and 2514(c)(1) of the Internal 
Revenue Code are both provisions excluding from the definition of a taxable general power of 
appointment “[a] power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of [the power 
holder] which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support, or 
maintenance of the [power holder].”  I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(A), 2514(c)(1) (2000). 
 65 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (discussing 2004 amendments).  The comment elaborates 
on this point as follows: 
The UTC, as previously drafted, did not specifically address the issue of whether a 
creditor of a beneficiary may reach the beneficial interest of a beneficiary who is also a 
trustee.  However, Restatement (Third) of Trusts §60, comment g, which was approved 
by the American law Institute in 1999, provides that the beneficial interest of a 
beneficiary/trustee may be reached by the beneficiary/trustee’s creditors.  Because the 
UTC is supplemented by the common law (see UTC Section 106), this Restatement 
rule might also apply in states enacting the UTC. The drafting committee has 
concluded that adoption of the Restatement rule would unduly disrupt standard estate 
planning and should be limited.  Consequently, Section 504 is amended to provide that 
the provisions of this section, which generally prohibit a creditor of a beneficiary from 
reaching a beneficiary’s discretionary interest, apply even if the beneficiary is also a 
trustee or cotrustee.  The beneficiary-trustee is protected from creditor claims to the 
extent the beneficiary-trustee’s discretion is protected by an ascertainable standard as 
defined in the relevant Internal Revenue Code sections. The result is that the 
beneficiary’s trustee’s interest is protected to the extent it is also exempt from federal 
estate tax.  The amendment thereby achieves its main purpose, which is to protect the 
trustee-beneficiary of a bypass trust from creditor claims. 
Id. 
 66 Id. § 506(b). 
 67 Id. § 506 cmt. 
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In this section, “mandatory distribution” means a distribution of 
income or principal which the trustee is required to make to a 
beneficiary under the terms of the trust, including a distribution upon 
termination of the trust.  The term does not include a distribution 
subject to the exercise of the trustee’s discretion even if (1) the 
discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution, or 
(2) the terms of the trust authorizing a distribution couple language 
of discretion with language of direction.68 
The primary purpose of this amendment was to remove any doubt 
that a distribution pursuant to a standard should not be considered a 
mandatory distribution for purposes of section 506.  As explained in the 
comment, the rights of creditors with respect to distributions pursuant to 
a standard are addressed under section 504 only, and not under section 
506.69 
B.     Rights of Creditors of Settlors 
 
Section 505 of the UTC governs the rights of creditors with respect 
to a trust created for the benefit of the settlor.  In most respects it 
follows traditional doctrine, with some minor innovations.  The section 
principally addresses three topics: (i) in subsection (a)(1), the rights of 
creditors of the settlor of a revocable trust during the settlor’s lifetime; 
(ii) in subsection (a)(2), the rights of creditors of the settlor of an 
irrevocable trust; and (iii) in subsection (a)(3), the rights of creditors of 
the settlor of a revocable trust following the settlor’s death.  Section 
505, in subsection (b), also describes the circumstances in which a 
beneficiary holding a withdrawal power will be treated as a settlor for 
purpose of these rules. 
 
 68 Id. § 506(a). 
 69 Id.506 cmt. As further explained in the comment: 
The [2005] amendment: 
. . . 
• correlates the definition of “mandatory distribution” in this section to the broad 
definition of discretionary trust used in Section 504.  Under both Sections 504 and 506, 
a trust is discretionary even if the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard, 
such as a provision directing a trustee to pay for a beneficiary’s support; 
• addresses the situation where the terms of the trust couple language of discretion with 
language of direction.  An example of such a provision is “my trustees shall, in their 
absolute discretion, distribute such amounts as are necessary for the beneficiary’s 
support.”  Despite the presence of the imperative “shall,” the provision is discretionary, 
not mandatory.  For a more elaborate example of such a discretionary “shall” 
provision, see Marsman [v]. Nasca, 573 N.E. 2d 1025 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991). 
• is clarifying.  No change of substance is intended by this amendment.  This 
amendment merely clarifies that a mandatory distribution is to be understood in its 
traditional sense such as a provision requiring that the beneficiary receive an income or 
receive principal upon termination of the trust. 
Id. § 506 cmt. 
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Section 505(a)(1) provides that, whether or not a trust contains a 
spendthrift provision, “[d]uring the lifetime of the settlor, the property 
of a revocable trust is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors.”  This 
rule is not terribly controversial—it treats the assets of a revocable trust 
as if they were owned by the settlor himself, thus bringing the treatment 
of revocable trusts for creditors’ rights purposes in line with the 
treatment of such trusts for federal tax purposes.70  The rule is 
inconsistent with the common law,71 but few if any courts would likely 
endorse the common law position today. 
Section 505(a)(2) follows traditional doctrine in providing: 
With respect to an irrevocable trust, a creditor or assignee of the 
settlor may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or 
for the settlor’s benefit.  If a trust has more than one settlor, the 
amount the creditor or assignee of a particular settlor may reach may 
not exceed the settlor’s interest in the portion of the trust attributable 
to that settlor’s contribution.72 
 
 70 Under sections 2036 and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code, the assets of a revocable trust 
may be included in the settlor’s estate for estate tax purposes, I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (2000); under 
section 676 of the Code, the settlor is treated as the owner of the trust assets for income tax 
purposes, I.R.C. § 676. 
 71 The common law, as expressed in the Restatement (Second), draws a subtle distinction 
between the rights of creditors arising as a consequence of a settlor’s power of revocation and the 
rights of creditors arising as a consequence of a settlor’s interests as a beneficiary.  As to the 
former, the Restatement (Second) takes the position that “a power of revocation reserved by the 
settlor cannot be reached by his creditors.  If he revokes the trust and recovers the trust property, 
the creditors can reach the property; but they cannot compel him to revoke the trust for their 
benefit.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 cmt. o (1959).  As to the latter, the 
Restatement (Second) provides that the settlor’s creditors “can reach the maximum amount which 
the trustee . . . could pay to him or apply for his benefit.”  Id. § 156(2).  Because most revocable 
trusts also authorize unlimited distributions to the settlor, the distinction would have no practical 
import in most cases—the distinction would be principally relevant in the unusual case of a 
revocable trust in which the settlor did not retain a beneficial interest. 
 72 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2).  Section 505(a)(2) may differ from traditional doctrine in 
one significant respect, although the difference may also be simply the product of a drafting 
oversight.  Section 505(a)(2) provides that a creditor of the settlor may reach the maximum 
amount that could be distributed for the settlor’s benefit, but the section does not expressly 
provide that a spendthrift provision is ineffective with respect to an interest retained by the settlor.  
See id.  In contrast, section 156 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which is often cited as the 
definitive statement of the traditional rule, provides both that a creditor of the settlor may reach 
the maximum amount that could be distributed for the settlor’s benefit, see RESTATEMENT  
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2), and that a spendthrift provision for a settlor is ineffective. See id. 
§ 156(1).  The practical significance of this difference is that, under the UTC, although a settlor’s 
creditor would have the ability to overcome discretionary limits on the settlor’s interest in the 
trust, the creditor may not have the ability to force a judicial sale of a non-discretionary interest. 
  One explanation for this difference may be that it simply reflects a drafting oversight—the 
comment to section 502 states that a spendthrift provision is ineffective with respect to a settlor’s 
interest, and the comment describes that rule as a “necessary corollary to § 505(a)(2).”  UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 502 cmt.  Nevertheless, section 502 provides that spendthrift provisions are valid 
“except as otherwise provided in this [article],” and nothing in Article 5—including section 
505(a)(2)—establishes an exception for an interest retained by a settlor.  Id. § 502(c) (alteration in 
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As explained in the comment: 
The drafters of the Uniform Trust Code concluded that traditional 
doctrine reflects sound policy.  Consequently, the drafters rejected 
the approach taken in States like Alaska and Delaware, both of 
which allow a settlor to retain a beneficial interest immune from 
creditor claims. . . .  Under the Code, whether the trust contains a 
spendthrift provision or not, a creditor of the settlor may reach the 
maximum amount that the trustee could have paid to the settlor-
beneficiary.  If the trustee has discretion to distribute the entire 
income and principal to the settlor, the effect of this subsection is to 
place the settlor’s creditors in the same position as if the trust had not 
been created.73 
As I have argued elsewhere, this rule in effect grants a settlor’s 
creditors greater rights than those held by the settlor himself.  In 
exercising its discretion to distribute income or principal to the settlor, a 
trustee has a fiduciary duty to consider the interests of all trust 
beneficiaries (not just the interests of the settlor) and thus cannot simply 
accede to the demands of the settlor for distributions; allowing a 
creditor to reach the maximum amount that could be distributed to the 
settlor ignores the limitations on the settlor’s access to the trust fund 
imposed as a consequence of this fiduciary principle.74  Nevertheless, 
the rule expressed in section 505(a)(2) has heretofore been widely 
accepted by courts and thus is likely current law in all jurisdictions, 
other than those—such as Alaska and Delaware—with legislation 
expressly changing the rule. 
Section 505(a)(3) provides that, following the settlor’s death, the 
assets of a revocable trust are subject to the claims of the settlor’s 
creditors, costs of administering the settlor’s estate, statutory allowances 
in favor of the settlor’s spouse and children, and additional amounts that 
might otherwise be payable from the settlor’s probate estate.  Section 
505(a)(3) applies only “to the extent the settlor’s probate estate is 
inadequate to satisfy those claims.”75  This rule has been relatively non-
controversial. 
The statute also addresses the circumstances under which a person 
holding a withdrawal power will be treated as a settlor for purposes of 
these rules.  Subsection (b)(1) of section 505 provides that, “during the 
period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of withdrawal 
is treated in the same manner as the settlor of a revocable trust to the 
 
original). 
 73 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) cmt. 
 74 See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HAST. L.J. 
287, 348-53 (2002). 
 75 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(3). 
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extent of the property subject to the power.”76  As explained in the 
comment, this subsection “treats a power of withdrawal as the 
equivalent of a power of revocation because the two powers are 
functionally identical.”77  Subsection (b)(2) provides that,  
upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power [of withdrawal], the 
holder is treated as the settlor . . . only to the extent the value of the 
property affected by the lapse, release, or waiver exceeds the greater 
of the amount specified in [sections 2041(b)(2), 2514(e), or 
2503(b)78 of the Internal Revenue Code].79   
Thus, a beneficiary who holds a so-called Crummey withdrawal power80 
would be treated under subsection (b)(1) as the owner of trust property 
(in the amount of the withdrawal right) while the power was in effect.  
Yet, under subsection (b)(2), the beneficiary would not be treated as 
owner after the power lapsed, assuming that the amount that could be 
withdrawn was limited to the amount specified in section 2514(e).81  
 
 76 The full text of subsection (b) provides: 
For purposes of this section: 
(1)  during the period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of withdrawal 
is treated in the same manner as the settlor of a revocable trust to the extent of the 
property subject to the power; and 
(2)  upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power, the holder is treated as the settlor 
of the trust only to the extent the value of the property affected by the lapse, release, or 
waiver exceeds the greater of the amount specified in Section 2041(b)(2) or 2514(e) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, in each case as in effect on [the effective date of this [Code]] [, or as later 
amended]. 
Id. § 505(b)(1) (alteration in original). 
 77 Id. § 505 cmt. 
 78 Sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e) establish special estate and gift tax rules, under which a 
lapse of a general power of appointment, which otherwise would trigger estate or gift tax 
consequences, is insulated from those consequences as long as the property that could have been 
appointed is less than or equal to the greater of (i) five thousand dollars or (ii) five percent of the 
value of the assets out of which the power could have been exercised.  See I.R.C.§§ 2041(b)(2), 
2514(e) (2000).  Withdrawal powers subject to the “five or five” limitation, as well as withdrawal 
powers that lapse to the extent of that limitation, are routine aspects of estate planning for 
individuals with transfer tax concerns.  Section 2503(b) refers to the $10,000 (as indexed for 
inflation) annual exclusion from the gift tax.  See id. § 2503(b). 
 79 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2). 
 80 Named for the case, Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), that first 
approved the use of this technique for obtaining gift tax annual exclusion treatment for transfers 
to irrevocable trusts.  
 81 There is a slight mismatch between the language of section 505(b)(2) of the UTC and the 
language of sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e) of the Internal Revenue Code.  Under section 
505(b)(2) the holder of a withdrawal power avoids settlor status whether the withdrawal power 
lapses, is released, or is waived.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2).  Under sections 2041(b)(2) 
and 2514(e), on the other hand, the holder of a withdrawal power avoids the estate or gift tax 
consequences of that power only if the power lapses; a release or a waiver of the withdrawal 
power, unless it satisfied the special rules for qualified disclaimers under section 2518 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, would be treated as an estate or gift taxable event.  See I.R.C. §§ 
2041(b)(2), 2514(e). 
  
2570 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:6 
 
This rule facilitates the common practice of granting beneficiaries 
Crummey withdrawal powers and withdrawal powers subject to the so-
called “five or five” limitations82 of sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e), 
without exposing the trust assets to the claims of the beneficiaries’ 
creditors.83 
 
III.     CRITICIZING THE CRITICS 
 
As discussed briefly in Part I, Article Five of the UTC has been 
subject of pointed criticism, with the critics claiming that the UTC 
represents a significant erosion of the creditor protection attributes of 
trusts at common law.  In many respects the arguments of the critics are 
murky, making it difficult to formulate coherent responses.  
Nevertheless, Part III of the Article attempts to identify and analyze the 
critics’ principal arguments. 
 
A.     Argument 1: The UTC Weakens the Creditor Protection 
Attributes of Spendthrift Trusts 
 
The critics argue generally that the UTC weakens the creditor 
protection attributes of spendthrift trusts.84  For the most part, this 
generalized argument is unsubstantiated, and for good reason—for it 
appears to have little basis in law or fact. 
The spendthrift protection afforded by section 502 of the UTC is 
consistent with the attributes of spendthrift trusts at common law.  If a 
beneficiary’s interest is subject to a valid spendthrift provision, a 
creditor of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution by 
the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary.  Note that the protection 
afforded by this rule operates both to prevent a court from forcing a sale 
of an interest for the benefit of a creditor and to prevent a court from 
ordering that future distributions be made to a creditor.85  A spendthrift 
 
 82 See supra note 78. 
 83 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt. 
 84 Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 478. 
 85 This point has been the source of apparent confusion.  In one of their articles, Mark Merric 
and Steven J. Oshins express their concern that section 501 of the UTC will be interpreted in such 
a manner that, although a creditor could not recover directly from a spendthrift trust, a creditor 
could nevertheless “attach the interest in the trust and merely wait [until the trustee decides to 
make a distribution] for satisfaction of his or her claim.”  Id. at 485.  The authors apparently 
believe that the UTC would allow a creditor to attach the beneficiary’s interest, after which any 
distributions that the trustee decided to make would be required to be made to the creditor.  This 
perspective is based on a misunderstanding of section 501, which applies only to trusts or 
beneficial interests that are not protected by spendthrift provisions.  As long as (i) the trust 
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provision is valid under the UTC only if it restrains both voluntary and 
involuntary transfers of the beneficiary’s interest, but this limitation is 
consistent with the law in virtually every jurisdiction in the United 
States.  The UTC makes it easy for a drafter to create a valid spendthrift 
trust—under section 502(b), simply stating that a beneficiary’s interest 
is subject to a “spendthrift trust” is sufficient to incorporate all the 
protections of section 502. 
The UTC, under section 503, creates a modest list of so-called 
exception creditors—specific categories of creditors, with specific types 
of claims, against whom a spendthrift provision is ineffective.  The 
exceptions for children, spouses, and former spouses for their claims of 
support are consistent with the majority rule in the United States.86  
Moreover, the UTC fails to include as exception creditors, and thus 
strengthens the protections of a spendthrift provision, various other 
categories of creditors that have been recognized from time to time by 
the courts, such as suppliers of necessaries or tort claimants.  
Furthermore, as discussed earlier,87 having the status of an exception 
creditor does not, by itself, grant the creditor any right to trust 
distributions.  Only those distributions that would otherwise have been 
made by the trustee (such as a mandatory distribution of income or 
principal, or a discretionary distribution of income or principal that the 
trustee has otherwise decided to make) may be the subject of a court 
order directing them to be paid to the exception creditor.  Thus, for 
example, if the trust is a discretionary trust, and the trustee determines 
in its discretion not to make a distribution, in most cases a creditor 
would be unable to force a distribution in satisfaction of its claim.88  
Note also that even with respect to distributions that the trustee either is 
required to make or has decided in its discretion to make, under section 
503(c) a court may limit the amount payable to the creditor, after taking 
into consideration the circumstances of the beneficiary and the 
beneficiary’s family.89 
 
includes a valid spendthrift provision and (ii) the creditor is not excepted from spendthrift 
protection under section 503(b), a creditor has no right to trust distributions until actually 
received by the beneficiary.  A narrow exception to this rule would apply in the situation in which 
a trustee is delinquent in making a mandatory distribution, in which case the creditor may be able 
to recover from the trust directly.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 506. 
 86 Of course, states are always free to limit the list of exception creditors, as several have 
already done.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.03.B (2005) (omitting spouses and former 
spouses); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-503(b) (2005) (same). 
 87 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
 88 There is a narrow exception to this assertion, with respect to claims by children, spouses, 
and former spouses in cases in which the trustee has failed to comply with a standard for 
distributions or has abused its discretion with respect to making distributions.  See UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 504(c). 
 89 See id. § 503 cmt. (discussing subsection (c) and referring to similar authority granted 
under section 501). 
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B.     Argument 2: Exception Creditors Are Granted Rights that Are Too 
Broad, and the List of Exception Creditors Can 
Readily Be Expanded 
 
The critics have argued (i) that the remedies available to so-called 
exception creditors are too broad and (ii) that the list of exception 
creditors can be expanded too easily.  This section of the Article will 
consider each of these arguments in turn. 
First, the critics apparently believe that one’s status as an exception 
creditor means that one will automatically be entitled to recover from 
the assets of a trust, even if the beneficiary’s only interest is 
discretionary.90  In fact, however, an exception creditor’s remedies are 
quite limited.  Section 503(b) provides that an exception creditor “may 
obtain from a court an order attaching present or future distributions to 
or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”91  Thus, the exception creditor’s 
remedy is to attach the beneficiary’s interest, not the assets of the trust.  
Moreover, if the beneficiary’s interest is discretionary, except in the rare 
case in which a child or spouse is able to establish an abuse of 
discretion under section 504(c), if the trustee in its discretion withholds 
distributions to the debtor beneficiary, then the creditor will be entitled 
to nothing. 
The critics also apparently believe that a governmental entity, as a 
potential exception creditor under section 503,92 will be able to recover 
as a creditor against a so-called supplemental-needs trust (a trust 
designed to avoid disqualifying the beneficiary for needs-based 
government benefits).  The critics observe that, under section 503, 
governmental agencies are no longer automatically considered an 
exception creditor for purposes of spendthrift protection.93  Thus, 
according to the critics: 
 
 90 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484 (“While exception creditors had no claim 
against a discretionary trust under common law, all exception creditors would be allowed to 
directly attach the assets of a discretionary trust under the UTC . . . .”).  This is not, strictly 
speaking, an accurate description of UTC law.  The remedy available to an exception creditor 
under section 503 is to attach “present or future distribution[,]” not the assets of the trust.  UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 503(b).  If the beneficiary’s interest is discretionary, the exception creditor would 
be entitled to nothing, unless and until the creditor chose to make a distribution. 
 91 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(b). 
 92 Section 503(b)(3) provides that a spendthrift provision is unenforceable against “a claim of 
this State or the United States to the extent a statute of this State or federal law so provides.”  Id. 
§ 503(b)(3).  Thus, a governmental entity—unlike children, spouses, and former spouses, for 
example—is not automatically an exception creditor under the UTC; the government becomes an 
exception creditor only if another state statute or federal law so provides. 
 93 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484; see also supra note 92 (discussing section 
503(b)(3)). 
  
2006] THE FUTURE OF CREDITORS’  RIGHTS  2573 
 
Once the state governmental agencies realize that they no longer may 
recover from this type of trust, it may be only a matter of time before 
the state or federal government is able to convince the state 
legislators to add them as an exception creditor.  At this time [that is, 
after the state legislators have acted], a state or federal governmental 
agency would be able to recover from all trusts in a UTC state, 
including third-party discretionary Medicaid or special needs 
trusts.94 
There are several problems with this statement.  First, the 
statement appears to be criticizing the UTC for failing to make a 
governmental entity automatically an exception creditor, because this 
will prompt governments to change the law so that they are 
automatically considered exception creditors.  It is difficult to see how 
the UTC constitutes a weakening of spendthrift protection, if the UTC 
removes the government’s previously existing right as a creditor.  
Second, the statement fundamentally misunderstands the relationship 
between state and federal law.  No matter what the UTC says, and no 
matter how the UTC may subsequently be modified by a state 
legislature, the federal government is not dependent on state law if it 
chooses to recover from spendthrift trusts.  If the federal government 
wishes to be treated as an exception creditor, a federal statute or a 
decision favorable to the government by a federal court will suffice.  
Third, as discussed in greater detail below,95 governmental entities that 
pay out benefits for disabled individuals (i.e., the beneficiary of a 
supplemental-needs trust) are almost never creditors of the beneficiary 
during the beneficiary’s lifetime.  With respect to certain types of 
supplemental-needs trusts, and under very limited circumstances, the 
government may seek reimbursement from the trust following the 
beneficiary’s death, but the creditor protection attributes of the trust 
during the beneficiary’s lifetime are irrelevant.  Moreover, in most 
respects the right of a governmental entity to recover from such a trust 
is dictated by federal law, not state law; thus, in this respect the UTC is 
irrelevant. 
Additionally, the critics are concerned that the list of exception 
creditors may readily be expanded by a state legislature.96  According to 
the critics, “[u]nder the UTC, the state legislature may easily do this 
statutorily by simply appending an unnoticed exception as part of any 
other bill that passes through the legislature.”97  In other words, the 
critics apparently believe that having the UTC on the books will make it 
 
 94 Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484. 
 95 See infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484 (citing, by way of contrast, Mississippi 
legislation overturning a court decision creating an exception for certain tort creditors). 
 97 Id. 
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easier for future legislation on the topic to avoid public scrutiny.  It is 
difficult to understand, however, why a statute modifying section 503 
would receive less attention than a statute modifying state common law.  
Moreover, if recent experience is any guide, any changes to Article Five 
of the UTC would be hotly debated. 
The critics also apparently believe that the list of exception 
creditors may be judicially expanded.98  Putting aside the question of 
why the existence of a codified list of exception creditors (as opposed to 
a list developed by the common law) would make judicial expansion 
more likely, as opposed to less likely, the critics approach this question 
with a faulty premise.  Article Five of the UTC expressly prohibits 
creditors from reaching the assets of a beneficiary’s interest in a 
spendthrift trust, “except as otherwise provided in this [article].”99  
Thus, the list of exception creditors in section 503(b) is exhaustive.100 
The critics are also concerned that section 503 of the UTC provides 
an opportunity for all creditors (not just exception creditors) to reach the 
assets of a spendthrift trust through bankruptcy proceedings.  As 
explained by Merric and Oshins: 
[W]hat if the federal Bankruptcy Code one day references the UTC 
exception creditor list? . . .  The federal Bankruptcy Code could take 
advantage of this loophole [the “loophole” being that section 503(c) 
contemplates the federal or state government granting itself status as 
an exception creditor] by enacting a statute such as, “[t]he Federal 
Bankruptcy Trustee is an exception creditor pursuant to section 
503(c) of any State that has adopted this provision of the Uniform 
Trust Code.” 
All a creditor need do is file an involuntary bankruptcy against the 
debtor, . . . and the creditor would have easy access to the trust 
assets.  In essence, this would mean all judgment creditors—not just 
alimony, child support, necessary expenses of the creditor, federal 
claims, state claims and tort creditors—but anyone who had a debt 
greater than $11,625 [citing the Bankruptcy Code].  Should federal 
bankruptcy law ever allow recovery against a trust in a UTC state, 
there is virtually no asset protection provided by a spendthrift 
provision.101 
There are several problems with this anticipated parade of 
horribles.  First, section 503(b) contemplates a state statute or a federal 
 
 98 See id. at 484 (“future exception creditors may now be added both judicially and 
legislatively”). 
 99 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(c) (alteration in original). 
 100 In this respect, the UTC notably differs from the Restatement (Third), which provides that 
its exceptions from spendthrift protection are “not exclusive” and that “evolving policy may 
justify recognition of other exceptions.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. a(2) 
(2003). 
 101 Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484-85 (emphasis added). 
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statute or court decision granting the government status as an exception 
creditor.  Because the bankruptcy trustee is a fiduciary representing the 
interests of creditors (which may or may not include governmental 
creditors), it is not at all obvious that it would qualify as a governmental 
entity for purposes of section 503(b).  Second, the presence or absence 
of the UTC as state law has no bearing on Congress’s ability to include 
spendthrift trusts as part of the bankruptcy estate—federal law will 
always preempt state law on such questions, regardless of whether the 
state law is embodied in the UTC or instead is set forth in a non-UTC 
statute or state court decision.  Moreover, it is absurd to think that 
Congress would target only jurisdictions that had adopted the UTC for 
such a rule.  Finally, as discussed earlier, having the status of an 
exception creditor does not guarantee that a creditor will recover from a 
trust. 
 
C.     Argument 3: Eliminating the Distinction Between Support Trusts 
and Discretionary Trusts Compromises Protection 
from Creditors’ Claims 
 
The critics argue that “the UTC . . . abolish[es] the 125-year 
common law distinction between a discretionary trust and a support 
trust, so that discretionary trusts must now rely on spendthrift protection 
for their asset protection value.”102  For a number of reasons, in my 
view the critics’ concerns about this issue are largely unfounded. 
Regarding the distinction (and supposed abolition of the 
distinction) between support trusts and discretionary trusts, some 
background may be helpful in understanding the critics’ concerns.  In 
certain respects the case law concerning the rights of beneficiaries and 
their creditors has drawn distinctions, though not consistently, between 
wholly discretionary trusts—trusts in which the beneficiary’s interest is 
described in purely discretionary terms, e.g., that distributions may be 
made (or withheld) in such amounts and for such purposes as the trustee 
determines—and so-called support trusts—trusts in which distributions 
to the beneficiary are made subject to a standard, such as one relating to 
the beneficiary’s health, education, or support.  The case law concerning 
these two categories of trusts often makes the following distinctions.  
With respect to a discretionary trust, the beneficiary is not entitled to 
any specific quantity of distributions.  Because the beneficiary cannot 
compel the trustee to make distributions, a creditor of the beneficiary 
similarly cannot; creditor protection in the case of a discretionary trust 
 
 102 Malpractice Issues, supra note 16, at 586. 
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depends not on the validity of a spendthrift provision, but on the nature 
of the beneficiary’s interest.103  With respect to a support trust, because 
the trust is established for the express purpose of providing for the 
beneficiary’s support needs, the traditional view is that the beneficiary’s 
interest cannot be alienated and, consequently, most creditors cannot 
reach the beneficiary’s interest, regardless of whether the trust includes 
a spendthrift provision.104  On the other hand, there is some authority at 
common law that a supplier of necessaries (either necessary services or 
necessary goods)—for example, a physician who has treated the 
beneficiary—may recover from a support trust,105 under the theory that, 
because the beneficiary could enforce the distribution standard, a 
creditor could also do so, if the payments to the creditor would be 
consistent with the standard.106 
In what respects has the UTC eliminated these distinctions, and to 
what extent does this affect the creditor-protection attributes of trusts?  
The focus of the critics’ concerns about this issue is on section 504 of 
the UTC, which contains two relevant provisions, subsections (b) and 
(c).  Under section 504(b): 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), whether or not a trust 
contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor of a beneficiary may not 
compel a distribution that is subject to the trustee’s discretion, even 
if: 
 
 103 Professor Scott elaborates on this point as follows: 
Where by the terms of the trust a beneficiary is entitled only to so much of the income 
or principal as the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to give him, he 
cannot compel the trustee to pay to him or to apply for his use any part of the trust 
property.  In such a case, an assignee of the interest of the beneficiary cannot compel 
the trustee to pay any part of the trust property, nor can creditors of the beneficiary 
reach any part of the trust property.  This is true even in jurisdictions where spendthrift 
trusts are not permitted.  If the beneficiary himself cannot compel the trustee to pay 
over any part of the trust fund, his assignee and his creditors are in no better position.  
It is the character of the beneficiary’s interest, rather than the settlor’s intention to 
impose a restraint on its alienation [by use of a spendthrift provision], which prevents 
its being reached. 
2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 155 
(4th ed. 1987).      
 104 The point is explained in the Restatement (Second) as follows: 
In a trust for support it is the nature of the beneficiary’s interest rather than a provision 
forbidding alienation which prevents the transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.  The rule 
stated in [section 154] is not dependent upon a prohibition of alienation by the settlor; 
but the transferee or creditor cannot compel the trustee to pay anything to him, because 
the beneficiary could not compel payment or compel application in any way except for 
the restricted purpose set out in the terms of the trust. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 cmt. b (1959). 
 105 Id. § 157(b) & cmt. c. 
 106 See, e.g., id. § 157 cmt. c, which elaborates as follows: “If such a claim were not enforced, 
it would tend to prevent the beneficiary from obtaining necessary services, and refusal to enforce 
such a claim is not necessary for the protection of the beneficiary’s interest under the trust.” 
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(1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of 
distribution; or 
(2) the trustee has abused the discretion.107 
According to the official comment, this language “eliminates the 
distinction between discretionary and support trusts, unifying the rules 
for all trusts fitting within either of the former categories.”108 
There is little, if any, doubt that section 504(b) does not diminish 
the creditor protection attributes of either discretionary or support trusts.  
If anything, the statute strengthens creditor protections associated with 
those trusts in several important respects.  First, even a supplier of 
necessaries cannot compel distributions from a support trust.  Second, 
the statute eliminates any argument that a support interest should be 
treated as mandatory and thus subject to compelled distributions to 
certain creditors, who would stand in the beneficiary’s shoes.  Third, the 
statute eliminates any argument that a creditor, under some 
circumstances, might be able to reach a discretionary interest under the 
theory that a beneficiary could have compelled distributions from a 
trustee who had inappropriately withheld distributions.109  Under the 
statute, even if the trustee has abused its discretion, a creditor has no 
right to compel distributions to the creditor.  This point is confirmed by 
the comment as follows: 
Eliminating this distinction affects only the rights of creditors.  The 
affect [sic] of this change is limited to the rights of creditors.  It does 
not affect the right of a beneficiary to compel a distribution.  
Whether the trustee has a duty in a given situation to make a 
distribution depends on factors such as the breadth of the discretion 
granted and whether the terms of the trust include a support or other 
standard.110 
Thus, the distinction between support and discretionary trusts is 
eliminated with respect to creditor claims only, not for purposes of 
determining the rights of beneficiaries. 
 
 107 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(b) (2005). 
 108 Id. § 504 cmt. 
 109 In this respect, note the difference between the approach of section 504(b) and the 
approach of the Restatement (Third), which states that 
if the terms of a trust provide for a beneficiary to receive distributions in the trustee’s 
discretion, a . . . creditor of the beneficiary is entitled to receive or attach any 
distributions the trustee makes or is required to make in the exercise of that discretion. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003).  The comment to the Restatement (Third) 
indicates that this language is intended to allow a creditor, under certain circumstances, to stand 
in the beneficiary’s shoes and to compel distributions that the beneficiary could compel.  Id. § 60 
cmt. e.  By contrast, under section 504(b), a creditor can never compel a distribution.  Moreover, 
even the Restatement (Third) contemplates that a creditor’s power to compel distributions will 
often be more limited than the beneficiary’s power to do so.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 60 cmt. e. 
 110 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c) cmt.. 
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Under subsection (c): 
To the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of 
distribution or has abused a discretion: 
(1)  a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judgment 
or court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance of 
the beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse; and 
(2) the court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or 
former spouse such amount as is equitable under the circumstances 
but not more than the amount the trustee would have been required 
to distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary had the trustee 
complied with the standard or not abused the discretion.111 
Again, the comment makes clear that the provision is intended to 
eliminate any distinctions between discretionary trusts and support 
trusts, but only with respect to claims of creditors.112 
Section 504(c) appears to strengthen traditional creditor protection 
in some respects, and arguably weaken it in others.  The provision 
strengthens creditor protection by expressly providing that a claimant 
cannot reach the beneficiary’s interest unless “the trustee has not 
complied with a standard of distribution or has abused a discretion.”113  
Presumably the burden would be on the claimant to prove that the 
trustee has so failed to satisfy his obligations.  In most cases, proving 
abuse of discretion would be inordinately difficult; the statute will thus 
dissuade many such claimants from seeking to recover from trusts.  
Moreover, a 2005 amendment to the statute makes clear that a trust that 
includes a support standard will be interpreted as granting the trustee 
discretion in carrying out its terms.114  Thus, proving non-compliance 
with a standard will be comparably difficult in most cases.115 
 
 111 Id. § 504(c).  
 112 Id. § 504. 
 113 Id. § 504(c). 
 114 Section 506 of the UTC was modified in 2005 to furnish a definition of “mandatory 
distribution,” which, under section 506(b), a creditor can reach if the distribution does not occur 
within a reasonable time after the designated distribution date.  Section 506(a) excludes from the 
definition of “mandatory distribution” “a distribution subject to the exercise of the trustee’s 
discretion even if (1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution, or (2) 
the terms of the trust authorizing a distribution couple language of discretion with language of 
direction.”  Id. § 506(a).  Thus, the statute contemplates that distributions pursuant to a support 
standard will be treated as discretionary, not mandatory.  This point is bolstered by language in 
the comment to section 506 as follows: “Under both Sections 504 and 506, a trust is discretionary 
even if the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard, such as a provision directing a trustee 
to pay for a beneficiary’s support.”  Id. § 506 cmt. 
 115 Most trusts establishing a standard for distributions expressly grant the trustee discretion in 
satisfying that standard.  Consider, for example, a trust providing that “the trustee may pay to or 
for the benefit of Child X as much of the net income or principal of the trust as the trustee may 
deem necessary for Child X’s support and health.”  Note that distributions from the trust are 
limited to those necessary for the beneficiary’s support or health, but the trust does not mandate 
that distributions for those purposes must occur—rather, whether and in what amounts to make 
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Section 504(c) arguably weakens creditor protection—at least in 
some jurisdictions—by expressly providing that children, spouses, and 
former spouses with support claims can compel distributions from 
discretionary trusts under some circumstances.  Although there is 
substantial case law supporting the proposition that a child, spouse, or 
former spouse may compel distributions from a trust for the support of 
the beneficiary,116 there is only modest support for the proposition that 
such a claimant can compel distributions from a wholly discretionary 
trust.117  Thus, states adopting section 504(c) may be changing their law 
in this respect.118  Of course, even if a claimant could theoretically 
recover from a discretionary trust, he or she would still be required to 
prove that the trustee has abused its discretion in withholding 
distributions, an inordinately difficult task under most circumstances. 
 
 
D.     Argument 4: The UTC Grants Enforceable Rights to 
Beneficiaries Not Held at Common Law 
 
The critics argue that the UTC gives beneficiaries of discretionary 
trusts enforceable rights not held at common law and that those 
enforceable rights undermine the asset-protection attributes traditionally 
associated with discretionary trusts.  The gist of the critics’ argument is 
that the creditor protection attributes of discretionary trusts depend on a 
creditor standing in the shoes of the beneficiary—if the beneficiary has 
no enforceable rights to trust distributions, then a creditor of the 
beneficiary similarly does not.  In the critics’ view, the UTC grants 
beneficiaries of discretionary trusts greater rights than they held at 
common law because the UTC requires the trustee to exercise its 
 
such distributions is left to the discretion of the trustee.  Moreover, defining what amounts are 
necessary for the beneficiary’s support and health are expressly made subject to the trustee’s 
discretion.  In such a case, a claimant under section 504(c) would have to overcome two 
significant obstacles to force a distribution from the trust.  First, the claimant would have to 
demonstrate a failure to comply with the standard—an especially difficult task, considering that 
the standard itself is within the trustee’s discretion.  Second, to the extent that the trustee 
withholds distributions, the claimant would have to demonstrate abuse of discretion, a daunting 
task under any circumstances. 
 116 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 cmt. b (1959); see generally SCOTT & 
FRATCHER, supra note 103, at § 157.1 (collecting and discussing various cases). 
 117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1); see also Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a 
Trust and Starve a Child: The Effectiveness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for 
Support and Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 707-14 (1994) (discussing various cases). 
 118 Whether this is appropriate as a matter of public policy is a question to which each 
adopting state is free to reach its own conclusion.  Thus, for example, several states have enacted 
a modified version of section 504(c), so that the rule applies only to support claims by children 
(and not by spouses or former spouses).  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN § 55-545.04.C (2005). 
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discretion in “good faith.”119  Apparently, the critics believe that the 
common law does not impose a good faith standard on trustees.  For a 
number reasons, in my view, the critics’ concerns about the effects of 
the UTC “good faith” standard are similarly not well founded. 
The first and most important problem with the critics’ concerns is 
that, in virtually all circumstances under the UTC, whether a beneficiary 
has the power to compel discretionary distributions is irrelevant in 
determining the rights of the beneficiary’s creditors.  Almost all trusts 
include spendthrift provisions and, under the UTC—except in the case 
of exception creditors, such as a child or spouse to whom the 
beneficiary owes a support obligation—a creditor cannot reach the 
assets of a spendthrift trust or a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift 
trust prior to the beneficiary’s receipt of a distribution.  Moreover, 
section 504(b) of the UTC prohibits creditors (other than a select list of 
creditors with specific types of claims) from compelling distributions, 
regardless of whether the beneficiary would have the power to do so.  
Thus, in most situations, whether the beneficiary could compel 
discretionary distributions would have no bearing on a creditor’s ability 
to satisfy its claim. 
In support of their position the critics cite to section 504(d) of the 
UTC, which states that section 504—which prohibits creditors in most 
cases from compelling discretionary distributions—“does not limit the 
right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial proceeding against a trustee 
for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard for 
distribution.”120  This language, the critics claim, grants beneficiaries a 
right to compel distributions, a right not held at common law.  But 
section 504(d) does not grant beneficiaries any rights at all; rather, 
subsection (d) expressly provides that section 504 does not limit the 
right of a beneficiary to maintain an action against a trustee.  Not 
limiting the right is not the equivalent of granting a right.  Moreover, the 
comment to section 504 makes clear that any right a beneficiary may 
have to compel distributions would be governed by section 814, not 
section 504.121 
The focus of the critics’ concerns is on section 814(a) of the UTC, 
under which a trustee is required to exercise discretionary powers “in 
 
 119 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a). 
 120 Id. § 504 (d). 
 121 Id. § 504 cmt.  The comment states that the elimination in section 504 of the distinction 
between support trusts and discretionary trusts 
does not affect the rights of a beneficiary to compel a distribution.  Whether the trustee 
has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on factors such as the 
breadth of the discretion granted and whether the terms of the trust include a support or 
other standard.  See Section 814 comment. 
Id. 
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good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust 
and the interests of the beneficiaries,”122 even if the trust instrument 
grants the trustee so-called extended discretion (by expressing that 
discretion with terms such as “absolute,” “sole,” or “uncontrolled”).  
According to the critics, at common law a trustee who is granted 
extended discretion has no obligation to act in good faith.  In support of 
their position, the critics cite to authority that prohibits trustees from 
acting in bad faith,123 which, the critics claim, is fundamentally different 
from the good faith standard imposed by section 814.  The critics also 
apparently claim that the “good faith” standard under section 814 
requires a trustee to act “reasonably,” which at common law, the critics 
claim, a trustee is not required to do.124  Finally, at least one 
commentator has questioned whether the requirement in section 814(a) 
that the trustee act “in accordance with the terms and purposes of the 
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”125 may enhance a 
beneficiary’s ability to challenge a trustee’s exercise of discretion.126  
 
 122 Id. § 814(a). 
 123 Merric and Oshins view the bad faith standard as exemplified by the standard described in 
a recent Colorado Supreme Court opinion.  See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 479 n.1.  In In 
re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991), the Colorado Supreme Court, in an en banc 
decision, stated that, “[i]f the settlor manifested an intention that the discretion of the trustee 
should be uncontrolled, the court will not interfere unless he acts dishonestly or from an 
improper motive, or fails to use his judgment.” Id. at 1156 (emphasis added) (citing SCOTT & 
FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 128.3).  Putting aside the question whether the standard stated in 
Jones is different from the standard stated in section 814, in several respects the critics’ reliance 
on Jones is problematic.  See Alan Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts: Alive and 
Well Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 567, 607-08 n.210 (2005).  
In the first place, Jones did not purport to establish a single standard for reviewing a trustee’s 
exercise of discretion.  Id. (noting at least four different statements in Jones concerning the 
appropriate standard of review).  Second, Jones did not involve a challenge to a trustee’s exercise 
of discretion; rather, the court was concerned with whether a beneficiary’s interest in a 
discretionary trust constituted property for purposes of a divorce settlement.  Id.  Also, it is 
noteworthy that, only one year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, an immediate 
appellate court in Colorado, in a case involving a challenge to a trustee’s exercise of discretion, 
approved the trial court’s finding that the trustee’s conduct constituted a “breach of his fiduciary 
responsibilities to act with the utmost good faith and fairness toward the beneficiary,” 
notwithstanding that the trust instrument granted the trustee “sole” and “absolute” discretion.  In 
re Estate of McCart, 847 P.2d 184, 186 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 124 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 481 (comparing language in the UTC and the 
Restatement (Third)). 
 125 UNIF. TRUST CODE §814(a). 
 126 See U.S. TRUST, PRACTICAL DRAFTING 7440 (2003).  As stated in Practical Drafting: 
Section 814(a) illustrates the uncertainty that codifying the trust law may create.  What 
do the words “and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the 
interests of the beneficiaries” mean?  Do they create a stricter limit on the discretion 
that may be conferred upon a trustee than the common law test set forth in the above 
quotation from Scott [see below]?  It seems likely that courts will use them to do so in 
particular cases, yet their application to particular facts remains as hard to predict as 
that of the common law.  Has anything been gained by codification? 
Id.  The reference to the “Scott” quotation is to the following: 
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For several reasons, in my view section 814(a) does not grant 
beneficiaries greater rights to challenge trustees’ decisions than those 
granted at common law. 
Implicit in the critics’ argument is the assertion that, by granting a 
trustee extended discretion, the trustee’s exercise of that discretion 
becomes essentially unreviewable.  But this has never been true at 
common law.  An essential principle of the common law of trusts is that 
a trustee’s exercise of discretion is always subject to judicial review, no 
matter how broadly the trustee’s discretion may be described.127  Thus, 
even if the trust instrument grants the trustee extended discretion, that 
will not be interpreted so as to relieve the trustee from an obligation to 
account for its discretionary judgments.128  Because a trustee is a 
fiduciary, it would be inconsistent with the concept of a trust to insulate 
a trustee’s exercise of discretion from all judicial review.129  Moreover, 
as a fiduciary, a trustee owes a duty of impartiality to the 
beneficiaries.130  Thus, a trustee could be subject to liability for favoring 
 
The extent of the discretion may be enlarged by the use of qualifying adjectives or 
phrases such as “absolute” or “uncontrolled.”  Even the use of such terms, however, 
does not give him unlimited discretion.  A good deal depends upon whether there is 
any standard by which the trustee’s conduct can be judged.  Thus if he is directed to 
pay as much of the income and principal as is necessary for the support of a 
beneficiary, he can be compelled to pay at least the minimum amount which in the 
opinion of a reasonable man would be necessary.  If, on the other hand, he is to pay a 
part of the principal to a beneficiary entitled to the income, if in his discretion he 
should deem it wise, the trustee’s decision would normally be final, although as will be 
seen the court will control his action where he acts in bad faith.  The real question is 
whether it appears that the trustee is acting in that state of mind in which it was 
contemplated by the settlor that he should act. 
Id. at 7439 (quoting 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 187). 
 127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (1959); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 211-12 (rev. 2d ed. 1980).  As stated in the Restatement 
(Second): 
The settlor cannot confer upon the trustee such an unlimited power that the court will 
not entertain a suit by the beneficiary to prevent the trustee from acting dishonestly.  It 
is against public policy to permit the settlor to relieve the trustee of all accountability.  
It is true that the powers conferred upon the transferee of property may be so extensive 
as to indicate an intention not to create a trust but to give the beneficial interest in the 
property to the transferee.  If, however, a trust is created, it is required by public policy 
that the trustee should be answerable to the courts, so far at least as the honesty of his 
conduct is concerned. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (internal citations omitted). 
 128 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c; 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 
103, § 187, at 15. 
 129 See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 
9.5, at 340 (3d ed. 2004) (observing that a “trustee” who is not subject to account makes no sense, 
because a trust connotes some control over the trustee); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 
cmt. c (stating that it is “a contradiction in terms . . . to permit the settlor to relieve a ‘trustee’ of 
all accountability”). 
 130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. b; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (2000) 
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one beneficiary (a remainder beneficiary, for example) over another (for 
example, a beneficiary requesting a current discretionary distribution). 
The critics place too much emphasis on the language in some cases 
indicating that a trustee may not act in “bad faith.”  Court decisions vary 
considerably in their formulations of the standards of conduct for 
trustees; the formulations differ from case to case not so much because 
courts intend to express substantively different standards, but rather 
because the facts of a specific controversy cause one court to emphasize 
certain aspects of the standard over others.  As an example of 
expressing the same standard using different words, consider the 
following passages from Professor Scott’s treatise, in which he 
considers the standard applicable to a trustee whom the settlor has 
purportedly relieved of the requirement of reasonableness:131 
In such a case the exercise by the trustee of his discretion will not be 
interfered with by the court, even though he acts beyond the bounds 
of a reasonable judgment, if he acts in good faith and does not act 
capriciously.132 
A later passage in the same section of the treatise expresses the 
standard as follows: 
Even though there is no standard by which it can be judged whether 
the trustee is acting reasonably or not, or though by the terms of the 
trust he is not required to act reasonably, the court will interfere 
where he acts dishonestly or in bad faith, or where he acts with an 
improper motive.133 
Professor Scott apparently views these formulations as 
interchangeable; there is no suggestion in the treatise that they should be 
viewed as substantively different.134 
 
(stating that, “[i]f a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in 
investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries’ 
respective interests”). 
 131 As to whether a reasonableness standard applies to trustees or may be dispensed with, 
consider the discussion infra notes 142-144 and accompanying text. 
 132 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 187.2, at 38 (emphasis added). 
 133 Id. § 187.2, at 39 (emphasis added). 
 134 See id. § 187.2; see also Newman, supra note 123, at 605 (discussing this point).  The 
comment to UTC § 814 further emphasizes this point: 
The obligation of a trustee to act in good faith is a fundamental concept of fiduciary 
law although there are different ways that it can be expressed.  Sometimes different 
formulations appear in the same source.  Scott, in his treatise on trusts, states that the 
court will not interfere with the trustee’s exercise of discretion if the trustee “acts in 
good faith and does not act capriciously,” but Scott then states that the trustee will 
interfere if the trustee “acts dishonestly or in good faith, or where he acts from an 
improper motive.”  3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts 
Section 187.2 (4th ed. 1988). 
Sometimes different formulations are used in the same case: 
[If] the “sole discretion” vested in and exercised by the trustees in this 
case . . . were exercised fraudulently, in bad faith or in an abuse of discretion, it is 
  
2584 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:6 
 
The critics’ assertion that a standard requiring “good faith” is 
different from—and, more specifically, is more onerous than—a 
standard prohibiting “bad faith” has no basis in the law.  A recent article 
by Professor Newman considers this issue directly: 
Is the requirement of subsection 814(a) that the trustee act in good 
faith, regardless of the extent of discretion the settlor grants the 
trustee, a change from the common law?   
No.  Cases from many jurisdictions explicitly acknowledge the 
requirement that trustees exercise discretion in good faith even if the 
trustee is granted extended discretion.  Many other cases, however, 
do not explicitly acknowledge the trustee’s duty to act in good faith, 
but instead provide that the trustee’s exercise of its discretion will 
not be disturbed absent one or more of factors such as bad faith, 
dishonesty, an improper motive, or a failure to use the trustee’s 
judgment.  The fact that these cases do not explicitly state that 
trustees must act in good faith, regardless of the breadth of their 
discretion, however, does not mean that the courts that decided them 
do not require good faith of the trustee. 
Rather, requiring that the trustee not act in bad faith, or dishonestly, 
or with an improper motive, or fail to act altogether is another way of 
expressing the fundamental fiduciary requirement that the trustee 
must act in good faith (or implicitly includes that requirement).  
There is much evidence that is the case.135 
Professor Newman examines numerous cases from around the 
country as well as other authorities and concludes that there is no 
support for the notion that the two standards are substantively 
different.136  To view the two standards as substantively different is 
nonsensical—if absence of “bad faith” means something other than 
“good faith,” what would that be?  Just to ask the question demonstrates 
the absurdity of the critics’ position—a fiduciary (or any person, for that 
matter) acts either in good faith or not. 
More fundamentally, the critics’ contention that at common law a 
trustee granted extended discretion is not required to act in “good faith” 
is simply wrong.  The critics can point to no authority to that effect, and 
for good reason, there simply is none.  Professor Newman is able to 
identify only one court stating that a trustee need not act in good faith, 
but the statement constitutes dictum and, upon closer analysis, it is 
 
subject to . . . review.  Whether good faith has been exercised, or whether fraud, 
bad faith or an abuse of discretion has been committed is always subject to 
consideration by the court upon appropriate allegations and proof. 
In re Ferrall’s Estate, 258 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1953). 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. (2005) (alterations in orginal). 
 135 Newman, supra note 123, at 605-06 (citations omitted). 
 136 See id. at 605-09. 
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apparent that the court was confusing the good faith standard with the 
requirement that the trustee act reasonably.137  There are no cases 
holding that a settlor may relieve a trustee from the duty to act in good 
faith, for obvious reasons—to do so would be patently in conflict with 
all notions of the standards of behavior expected from fiduciaries. 
The question whether the UTC’s “good faith” standard also 
requires a trustee to act reasonably implicates the more general question 
as to whether the common law of trusts imposes a reasonableness 
requirement on trustees.  Putting aside section 814(a) for the moment, is 
there a requirement at common law that a trustee act reasonably?  The 
authorities on this question are not consistent.  Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, “[i]f there is a standard by which the reasonableness 
of the trustee’s judgment can be tested, the court will control the trustee 
in the exercise of a power where he acts beyond the bounds of a 
reasonable judgment, unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the 
trust.”138  The Restatement (Second) further states that, if the nature of 
the power conferred on the trustee is “such that there is no standard 
indicated by the terms of the trust by which the reasonableness of his 
conduct in exercising or failing to exercise the power can be 
judged. . . .  [T]he court will interpose if the trustee acts dishonestly, or 
from some improper motive.”139  The Restatement (Second) further 
provides that the use of extended discretion language is “not [to be] 
interpreted literally but [is] ordinarily construed as merely dispensing 
with the standard of reasonableness.”140  The Restatement (Third), in 
contrast, observes that cases are difficult to find in which extended 
discretionary language has been construed to excuse unreasonable 
conduct.141  As discussed further below, the better view is that the 
 
 137 See id. at 609.  In Krug v. Krug, 838 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), a trustee was 
given the “sole discretion” to remove and replace a cotrustee.  According to the court, 
notwithstanding the use of the phrase “sole discretion,” the trustee was required to exercise his 
removal power in “good faith.”  Id. at 201.  The court stated in dictum that, had the trust 
instrument had used language such as “absolute,” “unlimited,” or “uncontrolled” discretion, under 
those circumstances the trustee would not be required to act in good faith.  Id.  As pointed out by 
Professor Newman, however, the dictum “appears to be based on the court’s mistaken treatment 
of the trustee’s obligation to act in good faith as the obligation to act reasonably.”  Newman, 
supra note 123, at 609. 
 138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. i (1959). 
 139 Id. § 187 cmt. i. illus. 12. 
 140 Id. § 187 cmt. j.  The comment further states that, “[i]n such a case the mere fact that the 
trustee has acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient ground for 
interposition by the court.”  Id.  Note that the Restatement demands reasonable conduct of a 
trustee if the discretionary grant of authority does not include language such as “absolute” or 
“unlimited.”  See id. § 187 cmt. e (stating that, under these circumstance, a court will interfere 
with a trustee’s exercise of power if the trustee “acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable 
judgment”); see also 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 187, at 14-15 (same). 
 141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (2003): see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra 
note 127, § 560, at 217-18 (“The authorities do not appear to support the Restatement [Second] 
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trustee’s conduct must always be reasonable, regardless of the breadth 
of discretion granted.142 
As to whether the UTC incorporates the distinctions drawn by the 
Restatement (Second), consider the following passage from the 
comment to section 814, as amended in 2005: 
Subsection (a) requires a trustee exercise a discretionary power in 
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust 
and the interests of the beneficiaries.  Similar to Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts Section 187 (1959), subsection (a) does not 
impose an obligation that a trustee’s decision be within the bounds of 
a reasonable judgment, although such an interpretive standard may 
be imposed by the courts if the document adds a standard whereby 
the reasonableness of the trustee’s judgment can be tested.  
Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 cmt. f (1959).143 
Notably, the comment refers to the distinction in the Restatement 
(Second) between discretion subject to a standard and discretion in the 
absence of a standard, as described above,144 but it does not refer to the 
earlier described distinction between ordinary discretion and extended 
discretion.145  By not addressing this question, the UTC may simply be 
leaving the matter to the common law.146 
Finally, does the requirement in section 814(a) that a trustee 
exercise extended discretionary powers “in accordance with the terms 
and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”147 subject 
a trustee to a higher level of scrutiny than at common law?  Numerous 
cases and other authorities confirm that, notwithstanding broad grants of 
discretion to a trustee, a trustee nevertheless must act in a manner 
consistent with the terms and purposes of the trust.148  The expression 
“interests of the beneficiaries” is defined in section 103(8) of the UTC: 
 
position that there is no requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of a power granted in the 
trustee’s absolute discretion.”). 
 142 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text. 
 143 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. (2005). 
 144 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.  According to the Restatement (Second), 
a reasonableness requirement is imposed only if there is a standard against which it can be 
measured. 
 145 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  According to the Restatement (Second), the 
use of extended discretion dispenses with the reasonableness requirement. 
 146 See Newman, supra note 123, at 610-11.  Professor Newman cites to UTC § 106, which 
provides that “[t]he common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this [Code], except 
to the extent  modified by this [Code] or another statute of this State.”  UNIF. TRUST Code 
§106(a) (first alteration added).  Thus, to the extent section 814 is silent concerning this question, 
a court would be bound by precedent or free to devise its own rule. 
 147 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a). 
 148 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. j (1959) (stating that a trustee granted 
extended discretion may not exercise its discretion “from some motive other than the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust”); see also Newman, supra note 123, at 614 & n.239 
(citing cases). 
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it simply means “the beneficial interests provided in the terms of the 
trust.”149  As stated in the comment to section 103, the “definition 
clarifies that the interests are as provided in the terms of the trust and 
not as determined by the beneficiaries.”150  This explanation should be 
sufficient to counter any suggestion that section 814(a) enhances the 
power of any particular beneficiary to demand discretionary 
distributions from a trustee. 
 
E.     Argument 5: The UTC Compromises the Effectiveness of 
Supplemental-Needs Trusts 
 
The critics argue that the UTC will undermine the effectiveness of 
so-called supplemental needs trusts—trusts intended to allow their 
beneficiaries to qualify for needs-based governmental benefits.  The 
critics’ arguments concerning this issue may be summarized as follows: 
With respect to Medicaid or special needs trusts, the 
UTC . . . create[s] two major concerns.  First, will a federal 
government or state government be able to attach the beneficial 
interest?  Second, will the Medicaid or special needs trust be 
considered an available resource of the beneficiary? 
For states that adopt the UTC, it may be only a short time before 
third-party Medicaid or special needs trust planning is greatly 
curtailed and eventually eliminated.  If the discretionary trust and 
support trust distinction no longer exists, the federal government or 
state legislature can pierce any trust by enacting a statute saying that 
the government may attach the beneficiary’s interest and reach some 
or all of the trust assets. 
In states that do not follow the UTC . . . , an interest in a 
discretionary trust is not a property interest (i.e., an enforceable 
right).  Both Medicaid trust and special needs trust planning depend 
on the dichotomy between discretionary and support trusts related to 
this property issue.  Regarding the second issue, if a beneficiary has 
an enforceable right to a distribution, the federal or state government 
need not necessarily attach a beneficiary’s interest.  The federal or 
state government may merely consider the trust as an ‘available 
resource’ and deny benefits.151 
Thus, the gist of the critics’ arguments is (i) that the federal or state 
government, as a creditor, may be able to attach the assets of a 
supplemental needs trust or the interest of the beneficiary, and (ii) that 
 
 149 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(8). 
 150 Id. § 103 cmt. (emphasis added). 
 151 Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 486 (footnotes omitted). 
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the UTC grants beneficiaries enforceable rights that will cause the trust 
assets to be treated as a resource of the beneficiary for purposes of 
qualifying for benefits.  In my view, for a number of reasons the critics’ 
assertions concerning these issues are fundamentally flawed. 
Some background about supplemental needs trusts may be helpful 
in understanding these issues.  A supplemental needs trust is designed to 
prevent the trust assets from being treated as a resource of the 
beneficiary for purposes of determining eligibility for needs-based 
governmental benefits.  The term “supplemental needs” refers to the 
fact that typically such trusts are structured to provide for needs of the 
beneficiary that are supplemental to the needs of the beneficiary 
provided for by the government.  There are two general types of 
supplemental needs trusts: (i) self-settled trusts, i.e., trusts for the 
benefit of the settlor, which are designed to avoid disqualifying the 
settlor for governmental benefits and (ii) third-party trusts, i.e., trusts for 
the benefit of someone other than the settlor, designed to avoid 
disqualifying the beneficiary for benefits.  Self-settled supplemental 
needs trusts are subject to federal law, enacted as part of the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), under which a trust that 
satisfies the OBRA requirements enables assets to be held for a disabled 
settlor’s benefit without disqualifying the settlor for public benefits.152  
A self-settled supplemental needs trust is effective for its intended 
purpose only if it is drafted in accordance with the OBRA 
requirements.153  The UTC will have no bearing on the effectiveness of 
these trusts under federal law.154  Whether the UTC will compromise 
the effectiveness of third-party supplemental needs trusts is a more 
difficult question, but, again, in my view, the concerns of the critics are 
unfounded. 
As illustrated by the earlier quoted materials,155 the first issue 
raised by the critics is that the federal or state government may attach 
the assets of a supplemental needs trusts or the beneficiary’s interest in 
such a trust.  The critics’ concerns about this question reflect some 
fundamental misunderstandings about the law governing public benefits 
and supplemental needs trusts.  The most commonly encountered public 
assistance programs are Social Security Disability Income, 
Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid.  With respect 
to Social Security Disability Income, Supplemental Security Income, 
and Medicare, there are no circumstances under which a governmental 
 
 152 See generally CLIFTON B. KRUSE, JR., THIRD-PARTY AND SELF-CREATED TRUSTS: 
PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED CLIENT 11-13 (3d ed. 2002). 
 153 See id. 
 154 See Newman, supra note 123, at 619. 
 155 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
  
2006] THE FUTURE OF CREDITORS’  RIGHTS  2589 
 
entity would become a creditor of a trust beneficiary, unless benefits 
were paid in error.156  With respect to Medicaid, federal law mandates 
the recovery of certain benefits following the recipient’s death and, 
except in the case of certain real property owned by a permanently 
institutionalized individual,157 there is no right for the federal 
government or a state government to attach the assets of the recipient 
during the recipient’s lifetime.158  If the supplemental needs trust is self-
settled, then federal law mandates reimbursement of any benefits paid 
during the beneficiary’s lifetime; under these circumstances, the UTC 
would simply be irrelevant.  If, instead, the trust is a third-party 
supplemental needs trust, in most cases the trust assets would not fit the 
definition of the “recovery estate,” as defined by state legislation 
implementing the Medicaid benefits scheme.  As long as the 
beneficiary’s right to receive distributions is subject to the trustee’s 
discretion, the trust should not form part of the beneficiary’s recovery 
estate and thus would not be available for reimbursement of any 
benefits paid during the beneficiary’s lifetime.159 
The second issue raised by the critics is that the UTC will cause a 
beneficiary’s interest in a third-party supplemental needs trust to be 
considered an available resource for purposes of qualifying for public 
assistance.  Although this is a more legitimate concern than the critics’ 
concern about the government as a creditor, in my view, once again, the 
concern is unfounded. 
Again, some background may be helpful in understanding the 
issue.  As a general rule, public assistance is limited to those with very 
limited income and other assets.  If the assets of a supplemental needs 
trust were treated as an asset of the beneficiary, he or she would likely 
not qualify for most public assistance.  The most important of the needs-
based public assistance programs is Medicaid, under which assets held 
in trust will be treated as a resource of the beneficiary only if the 
beneficiary has the ability to compel distributions for his or her 
support.160  Thus, the effect that the UTC has on a beneficiary’s 
eligibility for Medicaid depends on the extent to which the UTC 
enhances a beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions. 
Many supplemental needs trusts are drafted specifically to enable 
the beneficiary to qualify for Medicaid or other public assistance and to 
provide the beneficiary with amounts other than for the beneficiary’s 
 
 156 See Richard E. Davis & Stanley C. Kent, The Impact of the Uniform Trust Code on Special 
Needs Trusts, 1 NAELA J.  235, 237 (2005). 
 157 Moreover, a residence owned by a supplemental needs trust would not be considered to be 
owned by the beneficiary for purposes of these rules.  See id. at 238-39. 
 158 See id. at 238. 
 159 See id. at 239. 
 160 See KRUSE, supra note 152, at 52-54. 
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basic support.  Such a trust would typically preclude the trustee from 
making distributions for the beneficiary’s basic support needs and 
authorize the trustee to make distributions for the beneficiary’s 
supplemental needs—that is, to make distributions for non-essentials 
such as travel, vacations, cultural activities, private (as opposed to 
shared) institutional housing, elective medical care, etc.  There is 
substantial and consistent case law holding that the assets of such trusts 
are not considered available resources for Medicaid qualification 
purposes; moreover, the result is codified by statute in many 
jurisdictions.161  The UTC will have no effect on the continued 
effectiveness of such trusts for this purpose.  Under section 814(a), the 
trustee is required to carry out the terms of the trust in good faith; if the 
trust terms prohibit distributions for the beneficiary’s basic support 
needs, the UTC will require adherence to this prohibition. 
Next, consider a trust expressly intended to be a supplemental 
needs trust.  To what extent will such a trust be considered an available 
resource for Medicaid purposes, and what effect, if any, will the UTC 
have on that result?  In general, a trust under which the trustee is 
required to make distribution for the beneficiary’s basic support needs 
will be considered an available resource for Medicaid qualification 
purposes.162  The UTC will have no bearing on the treatment of such 
trusts.  On the other hand, in general a wholly discretionary trust 
without a support standard will not be considered an available resource 
for Medicaid purposes.163  As discussed earlier, the UTC should not 
enhance a beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions from such trusts; 
thus the UTC should not adversely affect the effectiveness of wholly 
discretionary trusts for purposes of Medicaid qualification. 
A more difficult issue is the Medicaid treatment of third-party 
trusts in which the trustee is granted discretion in making distributions 
for the beneficiary’s support.  Putting aside the effect that the UTC may 
have on this question, the case law concerning such trusts is 
inconsistent, with some cases holding that the trust assets are an 
available resource for Medicaid qualification purposes, and others 
holding that they are not.164  The cases turn on the court’s interpretation 
of the settlor’s intent and thus the outcome of any particular case is 
largely fact-driven.  The UTC should have little, if any, effect on the 
outcome of these cases, although for several reasons it may help 
somewhat for those seeking to qualify for public assistance.  First, as 
 
 161 See id. at 70-78 (discussing cases); 78-82 (discussing statutes). 
 162 See id. at 51-52. 
 163 See id. at 53. 
 164 See id. at 54-70 (discussing the issue generally); id. at 117-28 (tabular summary of 
significant cases). 
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earlier discussed, the UTC treats support trusts as discretionary,165 
thereby limiting a beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions.  Second, 
under a 2005 amendment, the comment to section 814 cites with 
approval language from the Restatement (Third) to the effect that, in 
exercising its discretion, a trustee should do so in a manner that avoids 
disqualifying the beneficiary for public benefits.166  In a borderline case, 
the comment to section 814 may help produce a favorable interpretation 
of the language of a discretionary trust that also includes a support 
standard. 
 
F.     Argument 6: The UTC Increases the Exposure of Trust Assets in 
Divorce Proceedings 
 
The UTC critics claim that the statute will have a multitude of 
adverse consequences for beneficiaries who divorce.167  Among the 
critics’ claims are: (i) that the UTC enhances the ability of a former 
spouse to reach the assets of a trust for purposes of satisfying an 
alimony claim; (ii) that the UTC will cause a beneficiary’s interest in a 
trust to constitute a divisible asset for equitable distribution purposes; 
and (iii) that the UTC will allow courts to consider a beneficiary’s 
interest in a trust for purposes of making alimony or child support 
awards.168  These claims reflect a misunderstanding of both domestic 
relations law and the UTC. 
With respect to the first claim, whether the UTC enhances the 
ability of a former spouse to satisfy an alimony claim depends entirely 
on whether a former spouse had that ability under the pre-UTC law of 
an adopting state.  In many jurisdictions, the common law already 
establishes a former spouse with an alimony claims as an exception 
creditor; thus, in these jurisdictions the UTC would effect no change in 
 
 165 This point is made clear in the 2005 amendments to the comments to section 506 of the 
UTC.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 166 The full text of the comment is as follows: 
[W]hether the trustee has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on 
the exact language used, whether the standard grants discretion and its breadth, 
whether this discretion is coupled with a standard, whether the beneficiary has other 
available resurces [sic], and, more broadly, the overriding purposes of the trust.  For 
example, distilling the results of scores of cases, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
concludes that there is a presumption that the “trustee’s discretion should be exercised 
in a manner that will avoid either disqualifying the beneficiary for other benefits or 
expending trust funds for purposes for which public funds would otherwise be 
available.”  Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 50 cmt. e & Reporter’s Notes 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. (2005). 
 167 A Divorce Attorney’s Dream, supra note 16. 
 168 See generally id. at 45-50. 
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the law.  In those jurisdictions in which a former spouse with an 
alimony claim is not an exception creditor, the jurisdiction is free to 
modify the UTC, as has occurred already in several enacting 
jurisdictions.  As observed earlier, the UTC may modestly enhance a 
former spouse’s ability to compel discretionary distributions in some 
jurisdictions, although the former spouse would need to prove that the 
trustee had abused its discretion, a daunting task under most 
circumstances.  Moreover, an enacting jurisdiction is again free to 
modify the UTC in this respect, as several jurisdictions have already 
done. 
With respect to the second claim, the UTC should have little or no 
effect on whether a beneficiary’s interest in a trust constitutes a divisible 
asset.  In most cases, such a trust would be considered separate property 
of the beneficiary and thus would not be subject to equitable 
distribution.  If the trust is in a jurisdiction in which separate property, 
in general, is subject to equitable distribution, whether the specific trust 
in question would be subject to division would depend on a multitude of 
factors, none of which would be affected to any significant extent by the 
UTC.169  The critics claim that a beneficiary’s discretionary interest in a 
trust is more likely to be subject to equitable division under the UTC, 
because, as the critics claim, the beneficiary will have an enhanced 
ability to compel distributions.  As discussed earlier, in my view there is 
no support whatsoever for the view that the UTC enhances a 
beneficiary’s ability to compel discretionary distributions.170  The critics 
also claim that, even if a beneficiary’s interest in a trust is not itself 
subject to equitable division, in a UTC jurisdiction a court will be more 
likely to take the beneficiary’s interest into account, as the court 
considers generally the beneficiary’s economic circumstances.  This 
claim, too, is founded on the notion that the UTC enhances a 
beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions from discretionary trusts, a 
notion earlier discredited. 
Finally, the critics claim that, in evaluating a beneficiary’s 
economic circumstances for purposes of making alimony and child 
 
 169 The factors are summarized by Professor Newman as follows: 
(1) whether the beneficiary’s interest is in a trust created by another that is revocable 
by its still living settlor; (2) whether the beneficiary’s interest is vested; (3) whether the 
beneficiary’s interest may be defeated by another’s exercise of a power of 
appointment; (4) whether the beneficiary’s interest may be eliminated by discretionary 
distributions to another beneficiary, or by another beneficiary’s power to invade 
principal; (5) whether the beneficiary’s interest is a remainder; (6) whether the 
beneficiary’s interest is an income interest; or (7) whether the beneficiary’s interest is 
subject to the discretion of the trustee and thus is treated as an expectancy, rather than 
as divisible property. 
Newman, supra note 123, at 627-29 (citations omitted). 
 170 See supra Section III.D. 
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support awards, a court in a UTC jurisdiction will impute trust assets 
and trust income to the beneficiary of a discretionary trust.  This claim, 
too, is based on the unsupported claim that the UTC enhances a 
beneficiary’s ability to compel discretionary distributions.171  As 
discussed elsewhere, there is no substantial support for the critics’ 
position concerning this question. 
 
G.     Argument 7: Drafting a Trust in a UTC Jurisdiction 
Constitutes Malpractice 
 
The critics have also argued that drafting a trust in a UTC 
jurisdiction may expose the lawyer to a malpractice claim for failing to 
advise his or her client of the increased exposure to creditors’ claims 
caused by the UTC.  The critics analogize this situation to that of a 
lawyer who fails to advise his or her client of the advantages of 
establishing a trust in a jurisdiction with no state income tax on 
accumulated trust income.172  According to the critics, a lawyer’s failure 
to disclose to his or her client the “potential decrease in asset protection 
available to beneficiaries” in UTC jurisdictions173 raises malpractice 
 
 171 In support of their position, the critics cite to a recent Massachusetts case, Dwight v. 
Dwight, 756 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), although they fundamentally misstate both the 
holding and the reasoning of the case.  See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 487.  Dwight does 
not, as the critics claim, see A Divorce Attorney’s Dream, supra note 16, at 50, stand for the 
proposition that the income earned in a discretionary trust will be imputed to a beneficiary for 
purposes of making an alimony award.  Dwight involved a separation agreement, which 
authorized the wife to bring a claim for alimony if the husband received a substantial inheritance.  
The husband’s father died, leaving a portion of his estate in a discretionary support trust for the 
husband and his descendants.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that 
the trust constituted a substantial inheritance for purposes of the separation agreement.  756 
N.E.2d at 20-21.  The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the trust 
increased the husband’s income, although this finding was based on highly specific factual 
circumstances, including the fact that the husband had told the trustee that he did not want to 
receive distributions that the trustee otherwise was inclined to make.  Notably, the case did not 
arise under the UTC.  The critics acknowledge this to be true, but claim that “the opinion cited the 
Restatement Third . . . as authority for dismissing the son’s claim” “that he had no enforceable 
right to a distribution.”  Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 487.  (The critics view the approaches 
of the UTC and the Restatement (Third) as equivalent with respect to a beneficiary’s right to 
compel distributions from a discretionary trust.  See id. at 478-79, 481.)  In fact, however, the 
Dwight court’s citation to the Restatement (Third) had nothing to do with the question whether 
the husband could compel distributions to himself; rather, the Restatement (Third) was cited in a 
footnote, concerning an issue that the court of appeals determined that it did not need to address.  
756 N.E.2d at 20 n.3. 
 172 See Malpractice Issues, supra note 16, at 592.  The question whether the failure to advise a 
client to establish a trust in a no-income tax jurisdiction constitutes malpractice is discussed in 
Michael J. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments and Economic 
Development: The Tort of “Negligent Trust Situs” at Its Incipient Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662, 
671-79 (1998-1999). 
 173 Malpractice Issues, supra note 16, at 586. 
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concerns.174  The gist of the critics’ argument is, of course, dependent 
on their position that the UTC dramatically decreases the asset 
protection attributes of trusts, a position without substantial support.  
For this reason, in my view the critics’ concerns about the malpractice 
question are misplaced. 
 
H.     Argument 8: The UTC is a “Regressive” Statute 
 
The most persistent of the critics, Mark Merric, has argued that the 
UTC is a “regressive” statute;175 he compares the UTC with the trust 
laws of Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah, which, he 
claims, are “considered by most estate planning professionals to be 
progressive trust statutes.”176  Thus, the apparent meaning of 
“regressive” is “unlike the laws in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode 
Island, and Utah.”  The common characteristic of the trust laws in those 
jurisdictions is that they expressly authorize the establishment of so-
called asset protection trusts—irrevocable trusts in which the settlor 
retains a beneficial interest, designed specifically to shelter the assets of 
the settlor from the claims of his or her creditors.177  As discussed 
earlier, the UTC follows the traditional approach by providing that a 
creditor of the settlor of an irrevocable trust can reach the maximum 
amount that can be distributed to the creditor.178  Although he has not 
stated so expressly, Mr. Merric’s characterization of the UTC as 
regressive, and his reference to statutes authorizing asset protection 
trusts as progressive, suggest that a principal motive behind his criticism 
of the UTC may be his desire to see more widespread adoption of asset 
protection trust legislation.179 
Reasonable people can differ as to the advisability of asset 
protection trust legislation.  The UTC takes the traditional approach by 
rejecting asset protection trusts as a matter of public policy.  Each 
 
 174 The critics make a subsidiary claim that adopting the UTC will lead to a loss of work for 
trusts and estates lawyers and professional fiduciaries, as trust business migrates to other, non-
UTC jurisdictions.  Note that this is an argument that can be used anytime someone opposes 
legislation that may make other states’ law more “favorable” for any purpose—the gist of the 
argument is that, once the legislation has been enacted, lawyers will be subject to malpractice 
liability anytime they fail to send work to lawyers in other states. 
 175 Arizona’s Nightmare, supra note 2, at 13. 
 176 Id. (emphasis added). 
 177 See Richard W. Nenno, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust Comes of Age, 38 
HECKERLING INST. EST. PLAN. ¶¶ 202-06 (2004) (discussing the statutes in all five jurisdictions). 
 178 See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text. 
 179 As described on the web site for his law firm, the use of asset protection trusts is apparently 
a significant focus of Mr. Merric’s practice.  See Merric Law Firm, LLC, Asset Protection 
Planning, http://www.internationalcounselor.com/ Serv-assetprotection.htm. 
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jurisdiction is free to make its own determination on this public policy 
question and can reject the UTC approach if it views asset protection 
trusts favorably.  Moreover, enacting the UTC is not altogether 
inconsistent with asset protection trusts—the statute can be modified, as 
was done in Utah, expressly to permit them.180  Thus, while it is true 
that the UTC follows the traditional approach in this regard, having 
done so should not be considered a deficiency in the statute. 
 
IV.     CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CODE 
 
This Part of the Article offers a normative analysis of particular 
elements of Article Five (and the closely related language of section 
814), and concludes with some modest suggestions for reform. 
 
A.     Abolishing the Distinction Between Support and 
Discretionary Trusts 
 
As earlier discussed, with respect to the claims of creditors the 
UTC draws no distinction between so-called support trusts and 
discretionary trusts.181  This is accomplished (i) in section 504(b) by 
providing that, in general, a creditor may not compel a distribution that 
is subject to the trustee’s discretion, regardless of whether the discretion 
is subject to a standard, and (ii) in section 504(c) by providing that, for 
certain types of creditors’ claims, the creditor may compel distributions 
that are subject to the trustee’s discretion, regardless of whether the 
discretion is subject to a standard.182  The comment to section 504 
makes clear that the distinction between the two types of trusts is 
abolished for creditors’ rights purposes, but not for purposes of 
determining the rights of the beneficiaries.  Moreover, section 506(a) 
 
 180 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-505(1)(b) (2005) (creating an exception to UTC § 505(a)(2) 
for certain self-settled irrevocable trusts, as authorized by section 25-6-14 of the Utah Code). 
 181 See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text. 
 182 The lack of this distinction in the UTC may also be reflected in section 501, under which, 
in the absence of a spendthrift provision, a creditor (including, arguably, a creditor without a 
support-related claim) may be able to reach the interest of a beneficiary (including, arguably, an 
interest for the beneficiary’s support).  This could not have occurred under the Restatement 
(Second).  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959).  On the other hand, section 
501 also provides that “[t]he court may limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under the 
circumstances,” suggesting that a court might not allow a non-support creditor to recover from a 
trust for the beneficiary’s support.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2005).  Whether a court would be 
likely to allow the claim would presumably depend, in part, on the nature of the non-support 
claim and on whether the assets of the trust were more than adequate to provide for the 
beneficiary’s support needs. 
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and the accompanying comment make clear that an interest in a trust 
subject to a standard will be considered discretionary, not mandatory, 
for purposes of determining the rights of creditors.183 
The conceptual foundation for the common law distinction 
between support and discretionary trusts depends on the notion that a 
beneficiary with an interest in a trust from which trust distributions were 
to be used for specific purposes should not be allowed to transfer his or 
her interest—to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes for which 
the trust was created.184  Similarly, allowing a creditor (other than one 
who had furnished so-called necessaries) to reach the beneficiary’s 
interest would be inconsistent with the settlor’s intent.  Thus, the rule 
developed that a support trust and a spendthrift trust were treated 
similarly for purposes of creditors’ rights.185 
Implicit in this conceptual framework is that the trustee of a 
support trust has little or no discretion in making distributions.  The 
prototype of such a trust would, for example, provide that the trustee 
“shall distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary as much of the 
income and principal of the trust as shall be necessary for the 
beneficiary’s support and health.”  Note how this prototypical language 
creates both a floor limiting the trustee’s ability to withhold 
distributions and a ceiling limiting the trustee’s ability to make 
distributions.  In theory, the trustee is not exercising discretion at all, but 
simply fulfilling the administrative task of implementing the dispositive 
provisions of the trust.186 
In practice, however, few, if any, beneficial interests subject to a 
standard are not also subject to the trustee’s discretion.  Even with 
respect to the apparently discretion-free language in the example above, 
the trustee arguably must exercise his judgment concerning the meaning 
of “support” and “health,” the amounts necessary to satisfy the 
beneficiary’s support and health care needs, the appropriate timing of 
distributions, whether distributions should be made directly to the 
beneficiary or instead directly to his support and health care providers, 
etc.  Moreover, as a practical matter, in most cases of beneficial 
interests subject to a standard, the trustee is expressly granted 
discretion.  Thus, the preceding example might have provided that the 
 
 183 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 506(a). 
 184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 cmts. b, c. 
 185 See id. (providing generally that a creditor cannot reach a beneficiary’s interest in a support 
trust or a spendthrift trust); see also id. § 157 (providing that certain classes of creditors can reach 
a beneficiary’s interest in a support trust or a spendthrift trust). 
 186 Similarly, a general power of appointment that is subject to an ascertainable standard 
relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the power holder is treated as non-
taxable for purposes of the federal estate and gift taxes.  See I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(A), 2514(c)(1) 
(2000). 
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trustee “may distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary as much 
income and principal of the trust as the trustee shall deem necessary for 
the beneficiary’s support and health.”  In this example, the granting of 
discretion to the trustee is explicit, not implicit. 
Should a court scrutinize the actions of the trustees in these two 
examples differently?  Possibly yes, but articulating how that scrutiny 
should differ is challenging.  This difficulty, and the apparent 
arbitrariness of drawing bright-line distinctions between support trusts 
and discretionary trusts, led the drafters of the Restatement (Third) (and, 
later, the drafters of the UTC) to abolish the distinction for some 
purposes.187 
For several reasons, abolishing this distinction in the context of 
creditors’ claims is a sensible statutory approach.  First, as the foregoing 
discussion demonstrates, determining the nature of a beneficiary’s 
interest is a more subtle exercise than the arbitrary distinction between 
support trusts and discretionary trusts might suggest.  Second, with 
respect to limiting creditors’ claims under section 503(b), a distinction 
between the two types of trusts is probably unnecessary, the UTC 
having abolished the preferred status of suppliers of necessaries.188  
Third, with respect to claims by the preferred creditors identified in 
section 503(c), there seems to be little reason to distinguish between the 
two types of trusts.  If anything, allowing such a creditor to reach the 
assets of a support trust but not the assets of a wholly discretionary trust 
may actually do greater violence to the intent of the settlor; depending 
on the precise terms of the trust, a settlor creating a trust for the 
beneficiary’s support may be more concerned about preserving assets 
 
 187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. a (2003).  As explained in the Reporter’s 
Notes to comment a: 
Not only is the supposed distinction between support and discretionary trusts arbitrary 
and artificial, but the lines are also difficult—and costly—to attempt to draw.  
Attempting to do so tends to produce dubious categorizations and almost inevitably 
different results (based on fortuitous differences in wording or maybe a “fireside” 
sense of equity) from case to case for beneficiaries who appear, realistically, to be 
similarly situated as objects of similar settlor intentions. . . . 
     . . . . 
     The fact of the matter is that there is a continuum of discretionary trusts, with the 
terms of distributive powers ranging from the most objective (or “ascertainable,” IRC § 
2041) of standards (pure “support”) to the most open ended (e.g., “happiness”) or 
vague (“benefit”) of standards, or even with no standards manifested at all (for which a 
court will probably apply “a general standard of reasonableness”). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 188 The point is that, under the common law, as exemplified by the Restatement (Second), in 
general a creditor could reach the beneficiary’s interest in neither a support trust or a discretionary 
trust.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154, 155(1) (1959).  A supplier of necessaries, 
however, could reach a beneficiary’s interest in a support trust.  Id. § 157(b), (c).  Abolishing the 
preferred status of supplier of necessaries thus partially obviates the need for a distinction 
between the two types of trusts under the UTC. 
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for the beneficiary (and thus sheltering those assets from creditors 
claims) than a settlor who creates a trust that is wholly discretionary. 
 
B.     The Good Faith Standard of Section 814(a) 
 
As discussed in Part III.D, the UTC critics claim that the good faith 
standard of section 814(a) subjects a trustee holding extended 
discretionary powers to a higher level of scrutiny than at common law.  
Part III.D refutes this claim, but it engages in no normative analysis of 
the good faith rule.  This Part of the Article considers the good faith rule 
as a normative matter.189  It also examines the apparent requirement 
under the Restatement (Third) that a trustee act “reasonably.” 
Section 814(a) of the UTC provides that 
[n]otwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the 
terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as “absolute”, 
“sole”, or “uncontrolled”, the trustee shall exercise a discretionary 
power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes 
of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.190 
Section 814(a) is a mandatory rule, meaning that it cannot be 
varied by the terms of the trust.191  The UTC further provides in section 
1008, also a mandatory rule,192 that 
[a] term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is 
unenforceable to the extent that it . . . relieves the trustee of liability 
for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless 
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the 
beneficiaries.193 
 
 189 Note that this issue—the degree of scrutiny of trustees making discretionary distributions—
is of limited relevance as far as creditors’ rights are concerned.  This is because, under section 
504(b), most creditors have no ability to compel discretionary distributions; in other words, they 
do not stand in the beneficiary’s shoes in this respect.  The issue is relevant, however, under 
section 504(c), because a creditor child or spouse does have the ability to compel discretionary 
distributions under limited circumstances.  The issue is also arguably relevant to (i) whether the 
trust interest is a countable resource for purpose of needs-based government benefits and (ii) 
whether the trust interest may affect the economic circumstances of the beneficiary for purposes 
of alimony and child support awards. 
 190 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a) (2005). 
 191 See id. § 105(b)(2) (providing that “[t]he terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this 
[Code] except . . . the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and 
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”) (second alteration in original).  Note 
that section 105(b)(1) was amended in 2005 to make its language consistent with the language of 
section 814(a).  See id. § 105 cmt. (discussing 2005 amendment, and noting that no substantive 
change was intended). 
 192 See id. § 105(b)(10) (providing that “[t]he terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this 
[Code] except . . . the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 1008”). 
 193 Id. § 1008(a)(1). 
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Thus, under the UTC, it is impossible to create a trust in which the 
trustee is not required to act in good faith. 
Should a trustee be required to act in good faith?  Stated another 
way, should the law permit a settlor to relieve a trustee from the 
obligation to act in good faith?  The answer to the second question 
depends on whether the settlor intends to create a trust, or whether the 
settlor instead intends to create some other type of property 
management arrangement, for example, a power of appointment, as 
discussed below.  But the essential attribute of a trust is the 
establishment of a fiduciary relationship, and a fiduciary relationship 
cannot exist if the person controlling investment and distribution 
decisions has no enforceable duties toward others.194  Moreover, an 
essential attribute of being a fiduciary is that you must place your 
personal financial interests secondary to the interests of the beneficiaries 
and that you must be impartial in your dealing with beneficiaries.  
Relieving a fiduciary of the obligation to act in good faith would thus be 
anathema to being a fiduciary; it would, in effect, mean that the trust 
would be unenforceable, an illusory arrangement in which the trustee 
would be beholden to no one.  Thus, the answer to the first question 
must be “yes.”  One can think of little associated with being a fiduciary 
that is more important than the notion that the fiduciary must act 
honestly and with motives that are consistent with the purposes of the 
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. 
As explained by Professor Langbein, the good faith requirement 
“serves a truth-in-labeling policy”: 
A settlor who wishes to benefit T, the trustee, may do so.  For 
example, the settlor may grant T, the trustee, a general power of 
appointment, which would allow T to appoint some or all of the trust 
property to T personally, but the settlor must identify the interest in 
that way.  The settlor may not get that result by dispensing with good 
faith administration of the trust, thereby allowing the trustee to loot 
the trust.  This insistence on correct labeling, in addition to 
promoting efficient judicial administration, serves protective and 
cautionary functions.  The suspicion is ever present that a term 
dispensing with good faith trust administration may not have been 
properly disclosed to the settlor, or that the settlor may not have 
under its effect. . . .  The mandatory rule against bad faith trusteeship 
can be understood to operate as a presumption that trust terms 
authorizing bad faith must have been improperly concealed from the 
settlor or otherwise misunderstood by the settlor when propounded, 
 
 194 This does not mean, of course, that the trustee cannot also be a beneficiary, but the sole 
trustee cannot be the sole beneficiary—the nature of a trust requires that the trustee owe a duty to 
someone other than himself or herself. 
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because no settlor seeking to benefit the beneficiary would expose 
the beneficiary to the hazards of bad trusteeship.195 
Professor Langbein’s example compares a trust with a general 
power of appointment, under which the power-holder can benefit 
himself or herself.  But a similar comparison can be made between a 
trust and a non-general power of appointment, under which the power-
holder can appoint to a class of persons that does not include himself or 
herself.  If the settlor wishes to relieve T from the obligation to 
distribute property among others in good faith, the settlor may do so by 
creating a non-general power of appointment.196  In other words, the 
requirement that a trustee act in good faith is directed not just against 
looting by the trustee, but also against the trustee failing to act 
impartially.  Bearing in mind the distinction between a trustee and the 
donee of a power of appointment, it is clear that the UTC does not 
require all parties to a trust to act in good faith; rather, it imposes this 
requirement only on trustees. 
As Professor Newman observes, an examination of cases from 
areas other than trust law reveals that the obligation to act in good faith 
is inextricably associated with being a fiduciary.197  Moreover, even 
outside the fiduciary context, the law frequently imposes an obligation 
to act in good faith.  For example, the Uniform Commercial Code 
establishes an obligation to act in good faith, even in the context of 
arms’ length business transactions.198  To suggest that a fiduciary should 
be held to a lower standard than parties who contract with one another 
seems patently absurd. 
A further question is whether a trustee granted extended discretion 
is or should be subject to a reasonableness requirement.  The origin of 
this issue lies apparently in the Restatement (Second), which suggests 
that under certain circumstances the conduct of a trustee should be 
evaluated by a subjective (rather than an objective) standard.  For 
example, comment i to section 187199 states that: 
 
 195 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1124 
(2004). 
 196 A power of appointment is not a fiduciary power and thus may be exercised arbitrarily, as 
long as it is exercised consistent with its terms.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. 
a (2003).  Thus, for example, if a settlor wishes for a person to have the power to distribute 
income among a group of beneficiaries with no obligation to allocate distributions among the 
recipients in good faith, the settlor can grant the person a non-general power. 
 197 See Newman, supra note 123, at 617-18 n.254 (citing cases involving insurers and 
insureds; personal representatives and beneficiaries of an estate; physicians and patients; 
principals and agents; etc.). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Section 187 provides that “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to 
the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an 
abuse by the trustee of his discretion.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). 
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The nature of the power conferred upon the trustee . . . may be such 
that there is no standard indicated by the terms of the trust by which 
the reasonableness of his conduct in exercising or failing to exercise 
the power can be judged.  In such a case, however, the court will 
interpose if the trustee acts dishonestly, or from some improper 
motive.  Thus, if power is conferred upon the trustee to appoint 
income or principal in favor of a particular beneficiary if he so 
chooses, without any reference to the needs of the beneficiary, the 
court will not interpose if the trustee acts honestly and from proper 
motives.200 
Note that this passage suggests that the trustee will not be in breach 
of his duties as long as he subjectively believes his conduct to be 
appropriate, even if the conduct may not be reasonable under an 
objective standard.  Comment j to section 187 further provides: 
The extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee depends 
primarily upon the manifestation of intention of the settlor.  The 
language of the settlor is construed so as to effectuate the purposes of 
the trust.  The mere fact that the trustee is given discretion does not 
authorize him to act beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.  
The settlor may, however, manifest an intention that the trustee’s 
judgment need not be exercised reasonably, even where there is a 
standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee’s conduct can be 
judged.  This may be indicated by a provision in the trust instrument 
that the trustee shall have “absolute” or “unlimited” or 
“uncontrolled” discretion.  These words are not interpreted literally 
but are ordinarily construed as merely dispensing with the standard 
of reasonableness.  In such a case the mere fact that the trustee has 
acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient 
ground for interposition by the court, so long as the trustee acts in a 
state of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that he 
would act.  But the court will interfere if the trustee acts in a state of 
mind not contemplated by the settlor.  Thus the trustee will not be 
permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust . . . .201 
Note, again, that according to the Restatement (Second), in the 
case of extended discretion, a trustee will not be considered in breach of 
his or her duties as long as he or she acts with a particular state of mind.  
This is a subjective, not an objective, test. 
Interestingly, as noted by numerous other observers, there seems to 
be little case law support for the Restatement (Second) position.  For 
example, according to Professor Bogert, “[t]he authorites do not appear 
to support the Restatement [Second] position that there is no 
requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of a power granted in the 
 
 200 Id. § 187 cmt. i (emphasis added). 
 201 Id. § 187 cmt. j (emphasis added). 
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trustee’s absolute discretion.”202  To the contrary, Professor Bogert 
concludes that 
[i]n addition to the commonly recognized factors used to determine 
whether there had been an abuse of discretion, a standard of 
reasonableness has been applied by the courts in judging the exercise 
of a discretionary power (whether simple or absolute), a standard 
implied from the settlor’s intent and the purposes expressed in the 
trust instrument.  With respect to court review of discretionary 
powers, this standard is consistent with the standard of care and skill 
of a prudent man and is based upon established fiduciary standards 
and principles.203 
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) observes that there are few, if 
any cases, in which extended discretionary language has been construed 
to excuse unreasonable conduct.204  Professors Dukeminier, Johanson, 
Lindgren, and Sitkoff are similarly skeptical that the case law supports 
the Restatement (Second)’s position.205 
As discussed earlier, the UTC properly requires a trustee to act in 
good faith, even in cases of extended discretion.  It would similarly be 
inconsistent with the concept of a fiduciary to excuse unreasonable 
conduct by a trustee.  A purely subjective standard for measuring trustee 
conduct is insufficient, because it could excuse highly questionable 
actions by a trustee as long as the trustee subjectively believed his or her 
actions to be appropriate.  Consider, for example, a trust under which 
the trustee is authorized to “distribute income and principal in such 
amounts and for such purposes as the trustee deems appropriate in the 
trustee’s sole and absolute discretion”—in other words, a wholly 
discretionary trust with language granting the trustee extended 
discretion.  Suppose the beneficiary, through no fault of his own, is 
destitute, but the trustee nevertheless refuses to pay for an objectively 
necessary medical procedure, believing in good faith that the 
beneficiary will recover from his condition without medical 
intervention.  In the absence of a standard of reasonableness, the 
trustee’s refusal to make a distribution may not be subject to review.206  
 
 202 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 127, § 560, at 217-18. 
 203 Id. § 560. 
 204 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 reporter’s note on cmt. c (2003). 
 205 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 540-41 (7th ed. 2005) 
(concluding that “the difference between simple discretion and ‘absolute’ discretion is one of 
degree and that the trustee’s action must not only be in good faith but also to some extent 
reasonable, with more elasticity in the concept of reasonableness the greater the discretion 
given”). 
 206 This is an extreme example, but it demonstrates that a subjective standard of good faith 
would not necessarily protect against all undesirable conduct by a trustee.  Presumably, virtually 
all courts would intercede on behalf of the beneficiary under these facts; some courts would hold 
that the trustee failed to act reasonably, others that the trustee had failed to act in good faith.  But 
note that a court holding that the trustee failed to act in good faith under these facts, in effect, 
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Moreover, a purely subjective standard would impose an undue burden 
of proof on beneficiaries seeking to challenge a trustee’s actions—in 
most cases, only the trustee would know whether he or she was acting 
in good faith, and evidence to the contrary would be difficult or 
impossible to produce. 
 
C.     The Power to Compel Distributions Under Section 504(c) 
 
Section 503(b)(1) of the UTC exempts certain claims of children, 
spouses, and former spouses from the effects of a spendthrift provision.  
The effect of the section 503(b)(1) exemption is to permit the claimant 
to attach trust distributions that otherwise would be made to the 
beneficiary;207 the provision does not authorize the claimant to compel a 
distribution from the trust.  Thus, the exemption entitles the claimant to 
receive mandatory distributions,208 as well as distributions that the 
trustee decides to make in its discretion.  In the case of a wholly 
discretionary trust, a trustee in its discretion could determine to 
withhold all distributions, in which case the section 503(b)(3) 
exemption would provide the claimant with no access to the 
beneficiary’s interest. 
As discussed earlier, section 504(c) of the UTC provides that a 
court may order a trustee to make a distribution from a trust for 
purposes of satisfying certain claims of children, spouses, and former 
spouses, but only to the extent that the trustee is determined to have 
failed to comply with a standard or has abused a discretion.  Section 
504(c) thus fills in a gap left by section 503(b)(1)—it permits those 
claimants to compel distributions under limited circumstances, thus 
preventing a trustee under those circumstances from withholding 
distributions for the purpose of defeating their claims. 
One of the critics’ principal objections to the UTC is that section 
504(c) expands the rights of these categories of creditors beyond the 
rights held by them at common law.209  In some respects they are 
correct, in the sense that a child, spouse, or former spouse under certain 
circumstances could theoretically compel distributions from a wholly 
discretionary trust (as opposed to a trust with a support standard),210 
 
would be imposing an objective standard on the conduct of the trustee, the subjective intentions 
of the trustee being insufficient to protect the trustee from liability.  Thus, even courts claiming 
not to impose a standard of reasonableness may in fact often be doing so. 
 207 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2005). 
 208 This is subject, of course, to the court’s authority to limit the claimant’s award, after taking 
into account the financial circumstances of the beneficiary.  See id. § 503 (c) & cmt. 
 209 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.  
 210 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
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which generally would not be possible at common law.  On the other 
hand, the claimant’s power under section 504(c) is quite limited—to 
prove abuse of discretion in many cases would be either a difficult or an 
insurmountable task.211 
Putting aside the question whether children, spouses, and former 
spouses with support claims merit special treatment for creditors’ rights 
purposes,212 having decided to exempt these creditors from the effects 
of a spendthrift provision under section 503(b)(1), did the drafters of the 
UTC take the right approach in granting these creditors the power to 
compel distributions under certain circumstances under section 504(c)?  
In one sense, if creditors with these types of claims merit special 
treatment, then section 504(c) is appropriate; otherwise, the benefits 
conferred upon them by section 503(b)(1) could largely be negated 
through careful drafting—limiting the beneficiary’s interest to the 
discretion of the trustee would significantly reduce the likelihood that 
one of these claimants would ever receive a distribution.  In this sense, 
section 504(c) is necessary in order to give the protections of section 
503(b)(1) any teeth.  Section 504(c) is also consistent with the notion—
largely rejected by section 504—that a creditor to whom a spendthrift 
provision does not apply should stand in the shoes of the beneficiary.  
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the powers held by a claimant under 
section 504(c) are limited, and in many cases the provision would do 
little to increase the likelihood of a claimant receiving a distribution. 
Is section 504(c) in any respect objectionable, putting aside again 
the question whether these categories of claimants are worthy of greater 
protection?  In my view, the answer is “no.”  The principal normative 
objection to section 504(c) would seem to be that it is inconsistent with 
the typical settlor’s intent.  However, if a legislature determines that 
these categories of creditors’ claims should be exempt from spendthrift 
protection, it has implicitly decided that the settlor’s intent must give 
 
 211 Nevertheless, section 504(c) does provide an element of protection to children, spouses, 
and former spouses.  Although it may be difficult for one of these claimants to compel 
distributions in most cases, the claimants are nonetheless exempt from any spendthrift limitations 
and thus are entitled to receive distributions that the trustee otherwise chooses to make, subject to 
the court’s power to limit their awards.  Considering the nature of their claims, it seems unlikely 
that a court would be willing to allow a beneficiary to receive substantial distributions without 
also allowing the claimant to receive distributions.  To avoid the claims altogether, the trustee 
might be forced to withhold distributions altogether, but this would increase the possibility that 
there would be an abuse of discretion or failure to satisfy a standard for purposes of section 
504(c).  In sum, sections 503 and 504, read together, probably do expand the rights of these 
claimants as a practical matter.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 503, 504(c). 
 212 Notably, a number of jurisdictions have limited the special rules of sections 503(b)(1) and 
504(c) to children only, relegating spouses and former spouses to the status of ordinary creditors.  
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-545.03.B, 55-545.04.C (2005).  This is a principled modification 
of the statute, for the obvious reason that a spouse or former spouse is on more equal footing with 
the beneficiary than is a child. 
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way to public policy.  Granting those creditors limited rights to compel 
discretionary distributions is no less consistent with the settlor’s intent, 
and is consistent with the general public policy determination that 
certain categories of claimants should have protected status. 
 
D.     Some Modest Suggestions for Reform 
 
This section of the Article offers some modest suggestions for 
improvements to Article Five and section 814(a). 
 
1.     Clarifying or Modifying the Relationship Between 
Sections 501 and 503 
 
Section 501 of the UTC describes the rights of a beneficiary’s 
creditors if the beneficiary’s interest is not subject to a valid spendthrift 
provision.  Under section 501, if a beneficiary’s interest in a trust is not 
subject to a spendthrift provision, “the court may authorize a 
creditor . . . of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s interest by 
attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary or other means.”213  Compare section 501 with section 
503(b), which describes the rights of an exception creditor: such a 
claimant “may obtain from a court an order attaching present or future 
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”214  The key 
difference between the two provisions is that section 501 allows a court 
to authorize a creditor to reach the beneficiary’s interest not just by 
attachment of present or future distributions, but also by other means.  
In the original version of the UTC passed by NCCUSL in 2001, the 
comment to section 501 offered the following explanation: 
A creditor typically will pursue a claim by serving an order on the 
trustee attaching the beneficiary’s interest.  Assuming that the 
validity of the order cannot be contested, the trustee will then pay to 
the creditor instead of to the beneficiary any payments the trustee 
would otherwise be required to make to the beneficiary, as well as 
discretionary distributions the trustee decides to make.  The creditor 
may also, in theory, force a judicial sale of a beneficiary’s 
interest.215 
The quoted language was omitted from the comment in connection 
with amendments to section 501 in 2005.  The comment now provides 
 
 213 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501. 
 214 Id. § 503(b). 
 215 Id. § 501 cmt. (2001) (emphasis added). 
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simply that “[t]his section does not prescribe the procedures (“other 
means”) for reaching a beneficiary’s interest . . . , leaving [that] issue[] 
to the enacting State’s laws on creditor rights.”216  In explaining the 
2005 changes, the comment further states that “[c]larifying changes 
are . . . made in the comments and unnecessary language on creditor 
remedies are omitted.”217  Thus, the drafters apparently believed that the 
earlier comment about a possible judicial sale of a beneficiary’s interest 
was unnecessary, because local law (outside the UTC) either would or 
would not provide such a remedy.  Nevertheless, the drafters clearly 
contemplated that such a remedy might be available under appropriate 
circumstances for actions brought by creditors under section 501.  The 
comment to section 503 offers no additional explanation for the 
differences between the two provisions, but it is apparent that the 
drafters contemplated that judicial sales would not be available under 
section 503.  The comment to section 503 mentions no remedies other 
than attachment of present or future distributions.  Moreover, an earlier 
version of the comment stated that section 503 “does not authorize the 
spousal or child claimant to force a sale of the beneficiary’s interest.”218  
This distinction between the approaches of sections 501 and 503(b) is 
consistent with the Restatement (Third).219 
The distinction between sections 501 and 503 should have little 
practical significance in most cases, because only rarely will a trust fail 
to include a spendthrift provision protecting each of the beneficial 
interests.  Nevertheless, if the drafters intend for the remedies under the 
two provisions to differ, which appears to be the case, it would be 
helpful to make this point explicit in the comments to both provisions. 
As to whether the distinction is appropriate, this is a question on 
which reasonable people can differ.  In one respect, the distinction 
makes little sense—if, as a matter of policy, a state determines that a 
spendthrift provision should be ineffective with respect to certain types 
of claims, then it would seem appropriate to grant exception creditors 
the full panoply of remedies available to creditors in the case of non-
spendthrift trusts.  Under this approach, a spendthrift provision would 
either be effective or not—thus, for example, the claim of a child with a 
support order could be satisfied in the same manner, regardless of 
whether the trust includes a spendthrift provision.  This approach would 
 
 216 Id. § 501 cmt. (2005). 
 217 Id. 
 218 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. b (2003) (citing an earlier version of the 
comment to section 503(b)). 
 219 See id. § 56 cmt. e (providing, in the case of trust with no spendthrift provision, that the 
court may order a judicial sale of the beneficiary’s interest); § 59 cmt. b (providing that, at least in 
the case of claims by children, spouses, and former spouses for support, an exception creditor 
cannot force a sale of the beneficiary’s interest). 
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also simplify the UTC, because the remedies prescribed in section 503 
would be superfluous. 
On the other hand, the distinction between sections 501 and 503(b) 
may simply reflect a reasonable political compromise, between those 
who would prefer that spendthrift protection be absolute and those who 
would prefer that it be completely ineffective with respect to certain 
categories of claimants.  In effect, the UTC provides that, with respect 
to certain categories of claimants, there is quasi-spendthrift protection, 
under which the claimant can attach present or future distributions, but 
cannot force a judicial sale of the beneficiary’s interest.  Because that 
appears to be the intended effects of sections 501 and 503, the point 
should be made explicit. 
 
2.     Clarifying or Modifying the Comment to Section 814(a) 
 
As discussed earlier, section 814(a) imposes on trustees a non-
waivable duty to act in good faith, which, as argued earlier, is consistent 
with a trustee’s duties at common law.  Section 814(a) does not itself 
address the question of whether a trustee is also required to act 
reasonably, although the issue is addressed in the comment, as amended 
in 2005: 
Subsection (a) requires a trustee to exercise a discretionary power in 
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust 
and the interests of the beneficiaries.  Similar to Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts Section 187 (1959), subsection (a) does not 
impose an obligation that a trustee’s decision be within the bounds of 
a reasonable judgment, although such an interpretive standard may 
be imposed by the courts if the document adds a standard whereby 
the reasonableness of the trustee’s judgment can be tested.  
Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 cmt. f (1959).220 
As observed earlier, the comment refers to the distinction in the 
Restatement (Second) between discretion subject to a standard and 
discretion in the absence of a standard,221 but it does not refer to the 
Restatement (Second)’s distinction between ordinary discretion and 
extended discretion,222 the drafters apparently intending to leave this 
question to the common law. 
 
 220 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. 
 221 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.  According to the Restatement (Second), 
a reasonableness requirement is imposed only if there is a standard against which it can be 
measured. 
 222 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  According to the Restatement (Second), the 
use of extended discretion dispenses with the reasonableness requirement. 
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The apparent purpose of the 2005 change in the comment was to 
refute the argument of some critics that the good faith standard of 
section 814(a) means that a trustee must also always act reasonably.  In 
my view, for at least two reasons, the 2005 change was ill advised.  
First, assuming that it is appropriate to relieve trustees from a standard 
of reasonable conduct, the comment should make clear whether the 
drafters intend that to be true, as in the Restatement (Second), if the 
instrument grants the trustee extended discretion.  Second, and more 
fundamentally, in my view it is inappropriate to suggest that, under 
some circumstances, a trustee may be relieved from a standard of 
reasonableness.  As observed,223 the Restatement (Second) approach to 
this question seems to have little support at common law and is 




This Article is, ultimately, a defense of Article Five: though 
imperfect, Article Five does not do what the critics claim.  It does not 
undermine spendthrift protections; in fact, in many respects, it actually 
strengthens them.  Moreover, contrary to the critics’ claims, Article Five 
does not constitute a significant departure from the common law.  
Where it does so depart (or with respect to questions for which the 
common law fails to provide a clear rule), Article Five strikes an 
appropriate balance between the interests of settlors and their 
beneficiaries and the interests of creditors.  At best, the critics’ claims 
about Article Five are misinformed or misguided; at worst, they are 
deceptive.  Most importantly, the arguments of the critics should not be 
permitted to impede further adoptions of the UTC. 
 
 
 223 See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text. 
